|
February 24, 2004
|
Case No: 04 CA 000281 (OC) - Brown v St Lucie West & Isle of Capri Association
|
|
Florida
Other Court
County of St. Lucie
Branch: State Circuit Civil
|
JOHN W. BROWN
Represented by: Cathy L. Purvis Lively, Esquire
v.
ST. LUCIE WEST SERVICES DISTRICT AND ISLE OF CAPRI NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION
INC. and ISLE OF SAN MARINO NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION
INC.
|
Summary
Brown, a 78 year old disabled veteran, purchased waterfront property in 1997. He place a bench in his backyard near the water, so that he and his wife could relax, enjoy the view and feed the birds. They maintained the bench for 6 years without any complaints or problems. In 2003, Capri, a neighboring association, sent a notice to Brown demanding removal and threatening fines. Brown does not reside in Capri. He attempted to resolve the issue with Capri and was then informed that St. Lucie Water Management District had jurisdiction as the bench was on their property. The District claims that the bench is on District owned wetland.
During the six year period that Brown maintained the bench, agents form the District had actually visited Brown and sat on the bench and at no time did anyone advise Brown of any problems related to the bench. In July 2003, agents from the District appeared at Brown's home, entered upon his property and destroyed the landscaping, threw debris onto Brown's yard and moved the bench. The agents caused damage to Brown's property. Despite Brown's objections, the agents sat and stood in his backyard causing further distress. Upon the recommendation of the District, Brown replaced the small wooden bench with a plastic PVC bench. This bench was removed by District workers in Nov. 2003.
|
|
Causes of Action: Declaratory Relief;
Injunctive Relief;
Trespass to Real property;
Trespass to Personal Property;
Replevin;
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
|
|
Judge: The Honorable Ben L. Bryan, Jr.
|
Current information/Final Decision
Pending, case filed 2/24/04 |
|
Lawsuit Text
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
NINETEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
AND FOR ST. LUCIE COUNTY,
FLORIDA
CASE NO.:
JOHN W. BROWN
Plaintiff,
v.
ST. LUCIE WEST SERVICES DISTRICT
AND
ISLE OF CAPRI NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC.
and
ISLE OF SAN MARINO NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC.
Defendants.
__________________________________/
COMPLAINT
The Plaintiff, JOHN W. BROWN (hereinafter "BROWN"), sues the Defendants,
ST. LUCIE WEST SERVICES DISTRICT (hereinafter "THE DISTRICT") and THE ISLE OF
SAN MARINO NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC. (hereinafter "SAN MARINO") and
THE ISLE OF CAPRI NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC, , (hereinafter "CAPRI") and
as grounds therefore, allege the following:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1. This is an action for Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief, and Damages.
2. BROWN is an individual, over the age of eighteen (18) and at all times relevant hereto a resident of St. Lucie County, Florida
3. BROWN is seventy-seven (77) year old disabled veteran who suffers from Charcot-Maria-Tooth Syndrome, a lateral disease of the central nervous system. BROWN'S wife suffers from Alzheimer's disease.
4. At all times relevant hereto BROWN has owned a real property located at 1013 NW Tuscany Drive, Port St. Lucie, Florida 34986 at and legally described as:
LOT 757, KINGS ISLE PHASE VI-A, ST. LUCIE WEST PLAT NO. 68, ACCORDING TO THE PLAT THEREOF ON FILE IN THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR ST. LUCIE COUNTY, FLORIDA RECORDED IN PLAT BOOK 35, PAGE 3, 3A THROUGH 3D, SAID LANDS SITUATE, LYING AND BEING IN ST. LUCIE COUNTY, FLORIDA.
5. The Isle of San Marino Neighborhood Association, Inc. is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Florida and has its principal place of business at 606 SW Bayshore Blvd. Port Saint Lucie FL 34983.
6. Bayshore Association Management, Inc. Is the Registered Agent for SAN MARINO , located at 606 SW Bayshore Blvd. Port St. Lucie FL 34883.
7. BROWN'S home is located in Isle of San Marino, which is a part of the King's Isle master community.
8. The Isle of Capri Neighborhood Association, Inc. is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Florida. Defendant has its principal place of business at 606 SW Bayshore Blvd. Port St. Lucie FL 34883
9. Bayshore Association Management, Inc. Is the Registered Agent for CAPRI, located at 606 SW Bayshore Blvd. Port St. Lucie FL 34883.
10. St. Lucie West Services District is a community development district and responsible for drainage and water management in the St. Lucie County, Florida.
11. THE DISTRICT is located at 450 S.W. Utility Drive Port St. Lucie, St. Lucie County, Florida.
12. On or about April 1997, BROWN and his Wife, Jeannie entered into a contract with Lennar Builders to purchase the residence located at 1013 Tuscany Drive, Port St. Lucie, Florida, 34940. (A copy is attached hereto as Exhibit "A").
13. BROWN specifically sought to purchase waterfront property and at all timesclearly indicated that he desired unencumbered access and unrestricted use of said land.
14. BROWN paid a premium price for the "waterfront" lot and was assured that they could use the property to the waterfront without restriction.
15. At the time BROWN purchased the real property, BROWN was aware of a ten (10) foot utility easement on the east side (front) of his property.
16. BROWN was acting under good faith belief that the ten (10) foot utility easement on the east side of the property was the ONLY easement on his property. (Copies attached as Exhibit "B").
17. On or about June 1997, BROWN placed a bench approximately 12 feet from the waterline at the rear of the property. Prior to the closing, BROWN was advised by the agents of the builder, Lennar Homes that he could place the bench in the desired locations .
18. During the period of 1997 to 2003 BROWN, maintained the bench consistently and without objection from any of the named parties hereto.
19. BROWN maintained a bench on his property so that he and his wife could enjoy the waterfront property.
20. During the period of 1997 through 2003, BROWN maintained the Bench in the same location, however, due to ongoing and unresolved erosion, the waterline became closer to the exact location of the bench.
21. BROWN made complaints related to the erosion and had himself replaced the sod and taken other preventive measures on no less than four (4) occasions. (Copy attached as
exhibit "C").
22. In 1999, BROWN donated a fountain and pump to the community which was placed in the lake, near BROWN'S property.
23. Prior to said donation of the fountain, BROWN met with John Gallagher to discuss placement of the fountain so to assure compliance with any regulations of the DISTRICT. During these visits, Gallagher was well aware of the existence of the bench and actually sat upon the bench.
24. At no time did Gallagher advise BROWN to move the bench and in fact advised BROWN that he saw no problem in BROWN maintaining the bench.
25. CAPRI was well aware of the existence of the bench and allowed said bench to remain in the location for a period of six (6) years.
26. After maintaining the bench for a period of six (6) years, BROWN was first made aware of any problems related to the bench when he received a letter from CAPRI which is a community located on the opposite of the lake. ( copy attached as Exhibit "D").
27. The bench was located on a parcel of land wherein there is an apparent dispute as to ownership, claim, interests and maintenance obligations, as between BROWN, SAN MARINO, CAPRI and THE DISTRICT.
28. At all times relevant hereto, BROWN, was over the age of sixty-five (65) and entitled to all of the protections afforded pursuant to the applicable provisions of Florida Statutes §415.111 as such, this matter should be advanced on the Docket.
COUNT I
29. This is an action for Declaratory Relief, as between BROWN and the DISTRICT, under sections §§86.011 et seq., Florida Statutes.
30. BROWN re-alleges each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs 1 through 28 and further allege:
31. In 1999, Gallagher, an agent of THE DISTRICT, advised BROWN, in reference to placement of the fountain, that the DISTRICT had a ten (10) foot easement along the lake, however, Gallagher never advised BROWN that the bench was impeding upon any property in which the DISTRICT had any ownership right or interests.
32. At all times relevant hereto, THE DISTRICT was well aware of the placement of said bench but took absolutely NO action until 2003.
33. On or about May 6, 2003 THE DISTRICT sent a letter to BROWN alleging that Brown had placed a park bench and built a railing and wall in the buffer surrounding a District owned wetland demanding removal of the same. . (A copy is attached as exhibit "E ").
34. The May 6, 2003, letter also refers to the property at issue as an easement The DISTRICT's letter of July 9, 2003 failed to provide BROWN with any opportunity to be heard.
35. There had been no record of said property having been designated as a wetlands.
36. On or about July 9, 2004, THE DISTRICT, sent Brown a letter demanding removal of the " bench, rail and canopy" from District property. The canopy refers to a tree that had been planted by the developer prior to BROWN closing on the property. ( a copy attached as Exhibit "F").
37. The July 9, 2004 letter references a survey wherein the "district's Property" was marked, indicating that the DISTRICT had more than an easement.
38. The July 9, 2004 letter threatened BROWN that expenses would be incurred against BROWN if he did not comply. THE DISTRICT's letter of July 9, 2003 failed to provide BROWN with any opportunity to be heard .
39. The DISTRICT's letters fail to establish any authority for claiming ownership of said property.
40. On or about July 24, 2003, agents of THE DISTRICT appeared at BROWN'S residence and removed the bench.
41. On or about July 25, 2003, THE DISTRICT sent a letter to BROWN acknowledging that they removed the bench and railing, that was placed on "district property" and advising that if the property was not removed, THE DISTRICT would confiscate the items. (A copy is attached as exhibit "G").
42. On or about October 2003, at the recommendation of the Gallagher, BROWN replaced the wooden bench with smaller and lighter PVC bench. BROWN in good faith relied upon the representations of the agent that the Bench would be acceptable. During this time Gallagher advised BROWN to replace the wooden bench with a smaller bench.
43. On or about November 4, 2003, agents of THE DISTRICT without the consent of BROWN, entered onto BROWN'S property and removed BROWN'S personal property, to wit, the PVC bench.
44. On or about November 4, 2003, BROWN received a Notice from Port St. Lucie Police Department Code Enforcement Division citing a Violation of Ordinance Sections 150.604(4A) and 97.03(B), "Placement of PVC Bench and Bricks not permitted on city Swale/Greenbelt." (A copy is attached as exhibit "H").
45. Port St. Lucie Ordinance, 150.604(4A) provides that "The following activities are hereby prohibited and declared unlawful in the Swale and vehicle recovery areas: "Placement or maintenance within the vehicle recovery area of trees, shrubbery, above ground sprinkler systems, signs, news racks, concrete blocks, coral rock, pyramid-shaped cement curbstones metal or wooden posts, railroad ties or any other sharp edged or pointed organic or nonorganic material which could cause a road or pointed organic or nonorganic
material which could cause a road or traffic hazard or injury to pedestrians. Nothing contained herein shall prohibit the location of mailboxes within this area not form the placement of landscaping or other improvements in a area within three (3) feet from the center of the mail box post or support, Nothing herein shall prohibit the placement of round cement buttons within the Swale and vehicle recovery Areas in front of improved properties."
46. Port St. Lucie Ordinance 97.03(8) provides that "No pyramids, stones, stakes shrubs, or trees are permitted in the Swale area. Swale areas must be kept free of trash, debris, and litter to prevent obstruction of the driveway culvert and Swale. If a plastic liner has been installed, it must be maintained. trash, debris, litter grass clippings, etc. must be removed to prevent obstructing water flow.
47. The area upon which the bench was placed was not a Swale
48. The area upon which the bench was located had not been designated as a Greenbelt as set forth in Florida Statute §260.13.
49. The DISTRICT allowed BROWN to maintain the bench for a period of six (6) years. Thus granting approval and should be estopped from now taking action against BROWN.
50. The sections of the ordinance for which BROWN was cited by THE DISTRICT are inapplicable to the circumstances at issue in that 150.604(4A) is applicable to Swale and vehicle recovery areas and 97.03(8) specifically applicable to Swale area. The disputed property
located at the rear of BROWN's lot is not a Swale or greenbelt.
51. The benches, including the initial wooden bench are movable and would not interfere with the maintenance of an easement.
52. At no time was BROWN afforded any opportunity for a hearing or other process to determine his rights and ownership interests and the actions of the DISTRICT are in violation of his due process rights.
53. A bona fide dispute between exists between BROWN and the DISTRICT, and BROWN has a justiciable question as to his rights as property owner, specifically as to the ownership and ownership interest of the property at the rear of BROWN"S lot and as to BROWN'S rights as a properly owner, specifically as to his right to maintain a bench on the property, for which BROWN has a bona fide actual and present need for declaratory relief. Bryant v. Gray, 70 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1954); Bell v. Associated Independents, Inc., 143 So.2d 904 (2d DCA 1962).
WHEREFORE, THE respectfully request that this Court: a. Declare that the removal of the bench by the DISTRICT as invalid and in
violation of BROWN'S rights as property owner.
b. Declare that BROWN has the right to maintain the bench.
c. Grant any other relief deemed fair and just.
COUNT II
54. This is an action for Injunctive Relief as to THE DISTRICT.
55. BROWN re-allege each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs 1 through 28 and 31 through 52 herein and would further allege:
56. THE DISTRICT, through its agents or representatives, has engaged in a pattern of deliberate and ongoing harassment of the BROWN, related to the removal of his personal property and destruction of his property.
57. On or about July 24, 2003, agents of THE DISTRICT appeared at BROWN'S residence and without the consent or authority of BROWN removed the bench, destroyed the curbing and handicapped railing, and landscaping.
58. The agents threw the debris into BROWN'S yard and as a result on or about July
30, 2003, BROWN received a letter from San Marino alleging violation of the Association documents related to debris in the yard. (Copy attached Exhibit "I").
59. The agents proceed to throw the debris onto BROWN's yard and placed the bench onto BROWN's yard, two feet from house.
60. During said actions, agents of the DISTRICT loitered in BROWN'S yard,removed their shirts and acted in an unprofessional manner which given the BROWN'S age and limitations was perceived as threatening.
61. The agents of the DISTRICT proceeded to stand and sit in BROWN'S yard and refused to leave when asked so by BROWN.
62. During said actions, agents of the DISTRICT entered upon property that undisputedly belonged to BROWN for the sole purpose of dumping the destroyed personal property. Said entry was without the authorization and against the wishes of BROWN.
63. Later on the afternoon of July 24, 2003, the agents returned and again, over BROWN'S objections, attempted to remove the bench that had been placed two (2) feet from BROWN'S.
64. The continued harassment by THE DISTRICT and/or their agents directly interferes with BROWN'S use and enjoyment of the property, rights as homeowner.
65. BROWN has no adequate remedy at law.
66. BROWN will be irreparably harmed by the actions of the defendants if aninjunction is not issued.
WHEREFORE BROWN request that this COURT
a. Enjoin the DISTRICT and/or its agents from further harassing
BROWN;
b. Grant any other relief deemed just and equitable.
COUNT III
67. Brown sues the DISTRICT for Trespass to Real property
68. BROWN re-allege each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs 1 trough28, paragraphs 31 through 52 and paragraphs 56 through 63 and further alleges:
69. On or about July 24, 2003, THE DISTRICT's agents, without the consent of BROWN, entered onto BROWN'S property.
70. Despite BROWN'S objections, THE DISTRICT'S agents destroyed items belonging to BROWN and threw the debris on BROWN'S yard.
71. By reason of the acts of the DISTRICT, BROWN sustained damages, including damages to his personal and real property.
72. By reason of the acts of the DISTRICT, BROWN sustained damages, including damages to his yard that is well within undisputed property, damaged to BROWN's plants, landscaping and other property.
73. On or about November 4, 2003, agents of THE DISTRICT without the consent of BROWN, entered onto BROWN'S property and removed BROWN'S personal property.
74. In doing the acts alleged in this Complaint, the DISTRICT acted maliciously and with a wanton disregard of BROWN's rights and BROWN is therefore entitled to damages.
75. In doing the acts alleged in this Complaint, the DISTRICT acted maliciously and with a wanton disregard of BROWN's rights and BROWN is therefore entitled to damages.
WHEREFORE, BROWN requests:
a. A jury trial on the merits and damages;
b. A judgment against THE DISTRICT for damages;
c. Any other and further relief as the court may deem proper.
COUNT IV
76. BROWN sues the DISTRICT for Trespass to Personal Property.
77. BROWN re-allege each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs 1 through, 28, 31 through 52, paragraphs 56 to 64, and paragraphs 69 to 75 and would further allege
78. At all time relevant hereto, BROWN was the owner and in possession of the personal property as set forth herein.
79. On or about July 24, 2003, THE DISTRICT unlawfully and with force entered on BROWN'S land and removed a bench, handicap railing, plants, landscaping and other materials thereby disturbing BROWN'S use and enjoyment of his real property.
80. On or about JULY 24, 2003, THE DISTRICT willfully and maliciously destroyed property, belonging to BROWN.
81. On or about November 4, 2003, at 1013 NW Tuscany Drive, Port St. Lucie, Florida 34986, agents of ST. LUCIE WEST unlawfully removed and retained personal property from BROWN'S yard.
82. By reason of the unlawful taking of the property BROWN has sustained damages.
83. On or about November 4,2003, THE DISTRICT again unlawfully and with force entered on BROWNS land and removed the a small PVC bench thereby disturbing BROWN'S use and enjoyment of his real property.
84. By reason of the unlawful taking of the property BROWN has sustained the damages.
WHEREFORE, BROWN requests:
a. A jury trial on the merits and damages;
b. A judgment against THE DISTRICT for damages;
c. Any other and further relief as the court may deem proper.
COUNT V
85. BROWN, files this Complaint for Replevin against THE DISTRICT pursuant to Florida Statute § 78.055.
86. BROWN re-alleges each and every allegations as set forth in paragraphs 1through 28 and 31 through 52, paragraphs 56 trough 63 and paragraphs 69 through 75 and paragraphs 78 through 84 and would further allege:
87. This is an action to recover personal property which to the best of BROWN's knowledge, information, and belief, is located at the office of St. Lucie West Services District, 450 S, W, Utility Drive, Port St. Lucie, St. Lucie County, Florida, which has been wrongfully detained.
88. This action seeks prejudgment possession and replevin of the personal property.
89. To BROWN's best knowledge, information, and belief, the value of the property is $275.84. (Attached receipt Exhibit "J")
.
90. Brown is the owner of the bench which was removed from his property by the DISTRICT and is entitled to possession of the same.
91. BROWN'S personal property is wrongfully detained by THE DISTRICT, which came into THE DISTRICT'S possession when agents of the DISTRICT removed said bench from BROWN'S property.
92. The claimed property has not been taken for a tax, assessment, or fine pursuant to law. Wherefore, plaintiff requests
a. issuance of a writ of replevin against THE DISTRICT for the mentioned property;
b. judgment in its favor and against THE DISTRICT for damages; and
c. any further relief as the Court deems appropriate.
COUNT VI
93. BROWN sues the DISTRICT for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
94. BROWN re-alleges each and every allegations as set forth in paragraphs 1through 28 and 31 through 52, paragraphs 56 trough 63 and paragraphs 69 through 75 and paragraphs 78 through 84 and paragraphs 87 rough 92 and would further allege that:
95. THE DISTRICT through its agents and or representatives took advantage of its position at all times knowing that the actions would cause BROWN severe emotional distress.
96. THE DISTRICT through its agents and or representatives, is in a position to inflict grievous harm greatly over and above the same actions, in a different setting and relationship, because of its position within the community.
97. THE DISTRICT'S conduct through its agents and or representatives is and has been outrageous, beyond all bounds of human decency.
98. THE DISTRICT'S conduct through its agents and or representatives would foreseeably cause BROWN severe distress, and as a result thereof, BROWN has suffered severe emotional distress.
99. The actions of THE DISTRICT through its agents and or representatives were and are now deliberately designed to and did take advantage of BROWN.
100. The actions of THE DISTRICT through its agents and or representatives were and are now outrageous and extreme within the meaning of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So.2d 277 (Fla.1985).
101. As a result of the actions alleged, herein, BROWN, suffered humiliation, physical pain and suffering, emotional distress, lasting psychological damage, mental anguish, betrayal, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, expense of medical care and treatment, aggravation of previously existing conditions, and the loss of self esteem. The losses are either permanent or continuing, and BROWN will continue to suffer the losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, BROWN requests:
a. A jury trial on the merits and damages;
b. A judgment against THE DISTRICT for damages;
c. Any other and further relief as the court may deem proper.
COUNT VII
102. This is an action for declaratory relief, as between BROWN and CAPRI under sections §§ 86.011 et seq., Florida Statutes.
103. BROWN re-allege each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs 1 through 28 and would further allege:
104. CAPRI is a separate development within the Kings Isle master community and has no authority over BROWN.
105. BROWN is a resident of SAN Marino and thus is not bound by the documents of CAPRI
106. On or about January 3 , 2003, BROWN received a letter from CAPRI regarding the placement of the bench and railing and other non landscaping items on the lake bank, citing as authority Article VII Section I of CAPRI's Documents. A copy is attached as exhibit "D").
107. BROWN received a "second notice" from CAPRI which is also dated January 1, 2003, wherein CAPRI citing violation of CAPRI's governing documents and threatening BROWN with fines. Said letter also advised BROWN was entitled to a hearing in from of the
Associations (CAPRI'S) Appeal Committee. (A copy is attached as exhibit"K ").
108. As a resident of SAN MARINO, BROWN is not subject to the governing documents of CAPRI
109. On or about March 29, 2003, BROWN received a letter from CAPRI acknowledging his request for an appeal hearing and advising BROWN that there would be on appeal hearing on April 28, 2003.(A copy is attached as exhibit "L ").
110. On or about May 1, 2003, BROWN appeared for an "appeal hearing" wherein the issue was "tabled" and it was determined that the matter was under the jurisdiction of St. Lucie West Services District. (A copy is attached as exhibit"M ").
111. On May 30, 2003, CAPRI, sent another letter to BROWN demanding removal of "all structures, railings, benches and landscaping" from "Isle of Capri property" at the rear of his
home and further sting that the items were on the "Saint Lucie West Services district right of way."(Attached as Exhibit "N").
112. 720.305 expressly provides that Each member and the member's tenants, guests, and invitees, and each association, are governed by, and must comply with, this chapter, the governing documents of the community, and the rules of the association. Actions at law or in equity, or both, to redress alleged failure or refusal to comply with these provisions may be brought by the association or by any member against
(a) The association;
(b) A member;
(c) Any director or officer of an association who willfully and knowingly fails to comply with these provisions; and
(d) Any tenants, guests, or invitees occupying a parcel or using the common areas.
(a) A fine or suspension may not be imposed without notice of at least 14 days to the person sought to be fined or suspended and an opportunity for a hearing before a committee of at least three members appointed by the board who are not officers, directors, or employees of the association, or the spouse, parent, child, brother, or sister of an officer, director, or employee. If the committee, by majority vote, does not approve a proposed fine or suspension, it may not be
imposed.
113. BROWN does not fall into any of the categories under which CAPRI may seek the actions as threatened in the letters, including the imposition of fines per Florida Statute Chapter 720.
114. A bona fide dispute between BROWN and CAPRI and BROWN has a justiciable question as to his rights as a homeowner residing outside of the CAPRI community for which BROWN has a bona fide actual and present need for declaratory relief. Bryant v. Gray, 70 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1954); Bell v. Associated Independents, Inc., 143 So.2d 904 (2d DCA 1962).
WHEREFORE, BROWN respectfully request that this Court:
a. Declare that CAPRI has no authority over BROWN;
b. Declare that BROWN has the right to maintain the bench;
c. Grant any other relief deemed fair and just.
COUNT VIII
115. This is an action for Injunctive Relief as to CAPRI.
116. BROWN re-allege each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs 1 and 26 and paragraph 104 through 113 herein and would further allege:
117. CAPRI, through its agents or representatives, has engaged in a pattern of deliberate and ongoing harassment of the BROWN, related to the removal of his personal property and destruction of his property.
118. The continued harassment by the CAPRI and/or their agents directly interferes with BROWN'S use and enjoyment of the property, rights as homeowner and member of the Association.
119. BROWN has no adequate remedy at law.
120. BROWN will be irreparably harmed by the actions of the defendants if an injunction is not issued.
WHEREFORE BROWN request that this COURT
a. Enjoin the CAPRI and/or its agents from further harassing
BROWN;
b. Grant any other relief deemed fair and just.
COUNT IX
121. This is an action for Declaratory Relief, under sections §§86.011 et seq., Florida Statutes.
122. BROWN re-alleges each and every allegation as set forth herein and would further allege:
123. Through the course of the events set forth herein it has been learned that there is a dispute as to interests, rights and obligations as to each of the parties named in this action as to the property upon which the bench at issue was placed
.
124. The determination as to the interests, rights and obligations as to each of the parties has direct bearing on BROWN'S rights as a property owner and his right of the use and enjoyment of the property
.
125. CAPRI claims that the Association has an ownership right and the right to regulate the property.
126. The DISTRICT claims both an Easement, either ten (10) or twenty (20) feet.
127. BROWN, claims ownership of the property.
128. The disputed property is located within SAN MARINO.
129. A bona fide dispute between exists between BROWN, the DISTRICT, CAPRI and SAN MARINO and BROWN has a justiciable question as to his rights as property owner, specifically as to the ownership and ownership interest of the property at the rear of BROWN"S lot and as to any right stemming form the same., for which BROWN has a bona fide actual and present need for declaratory relief. Bryant v. Gray, 70 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1954); Bell v. Associated
Independents, Inc., 143 So.2d 904 (2d DCA 1962).
WHEREFORE, BROWN respectfully request that this Court:
a. Determine the parties' rights as to ownership, interests and rights as to the
disputed property.
b. Grant any other relief deemed fair and just.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
130. Brown demands a jury trial on all relevant claims.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA)
COUNTY OF PALM BEACH)
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, personally appeared, JOHN BROWN, who after
first being duly sworn deposes and says that the allegations contained in the foregoing are true and
correct.
JOHN BROWN
SWORN to and SUBSCRIBED before me this day of , 2004.
Notary Public, State of Florida,
My Commission Expires:
CATHY L. PURVIS LIVELY, ESQUIRE, P.A.
6801 Lake Worth Road # 336
Lake Worth, FL 33467
561-649-2204
CATHY L. PURVIS LIVELY, ESQUIRE
FLORIDA BAR NO. 0055395
|
|
| |
|
View Comments (2) | Post a comment |
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
