California Court of Appeal Holds LA County Payment of "Local Judicial Benefits" to LA Superior Court Judges Unconstitutional Rendering State Bar Prosecution and State Bar Court Decision a Sham, Without Merit, Frivolous and Baseless

October 22, 2008

By Richard I. Fine (View author info)

On October 10, 2008 the California Court of Appeal held that the payment of "local judicial benefits" by the County of Los Angeles to the Los Angeles County Superior Court Judges is unconstitutional under Article VI, section 19 of the California Constitution and not allowed under the Lockyer-Isenberg 1997 Trial Court Funding Act. The case is Harold P. Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles (App. Case No. D050832, LASC Case No. BC 351286, Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, Certified for Publication).

The Court held at pages 1-2:

"Section 19 article VI of the California Constitution requires that the Legislature "prescribe compensation for judges of courts of record. The duty to prescribe judicial compensation is not delegable. Thus the practice of the County of Los Angeles of providing Los Angeles County superior court judges with employment benefits, in addition to the compensation prescribed by the legislature, is not permissible."

The Court further held at page 35:

"Both section 69894.3 and the audit and credit procedures set forth in Lockyer-Isenberg are also ineffective as legislative prescriptions. They do not require the payment of benefits, let alone set any standard or safeguard which regulate the size or the conditions under which they should be paid. In giving the county's the option of providing the benefits, and no limitation on the kind and amount of those benefits, these statutes in no sense set a fundamental policy with respect to benefits, provide any standard for applying such a policy, or contain any safeguards which would insure that benefits are consistent with the Legislature's adopted policy. Indeed, without violating section 69894.3 or Lockyer-Isenberg, the county could, in any given year, deprive its judges of MegaFlex benefits and continue to provide them to other employees."

The court concluded at pages 36-37:

"Because the benefits provided by the county are compensation within the meaning of section 19. Article VI of our Constitution, and because this record does not establish those benefits have not been prescribed by the Legislature, the trial court erred in granting the county's motion for summary judgment."

The Sturgeon decision had four immediate effects. It showed:

(1) that people who had cases against LA County in the LA Superior Court were denied their constitutional rights of "access to the courts" and "a fair trial" in the LA Superior Court;
(2) that the California State Bar's prosecution against Richard I. Fine was a sham, without merit, frivolous and baseless;
(3) that the California State Bar Court's recommendation that Richard I. Fine be "disbarred" for having brought federal civil rights cases claiming the LA County payments were unconstitutional and having filed motions to disqualify judicial officers based upon their having received the unconstitutional LA County payments a sham, without merit, frivolous and baseless; and
(4) that the California State Bar and State Bar Court were acting to assist the Los Angeles Superior Court to retaliate against Richard I. Fine for being the first lawyer to expose and seek to stop the unconstitutional and unlawful "local judicial benefit" payments.

What Are "Local Judicial Benefits"

"Local judicial benefits" are payments made by LA County and other California counties to superior court judges and court commissioners in addition to their California State salaries and other compensation. In LA County, "local judicial benefits" presently amount to approximately $46,436.00 per year. The present California State salary of a superior court judge is $178,789.00 per year as set by the California Government Code. The total cash received by a Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge is $225,225.00. This is more that an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court who is paid approximately $217,000.00 per year and the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court who is paid approximately $218,000.00 per year.

"Local judicial benefits" payments by LA County are voluntary. They consist of cash payments of 19% of the judge's state salary to purchase the LA County "MegaFlex Cafeteria Benefit Plan" insurance plan or other insurance benefits, a "professional development allowance" presently amounting to $6,876.00 per year, and contributions to a 401(k) of 4% of the judge's salary presently amounting to approximately $6,880.00 per year. In the year 2007, LA County paid approximately $30 million in "local judicial benefits". Over the past twenty years, LA County has paid hundreds of millions of dollars to state employees who are LA Superior Court Judges and court employees.

"Local judicial benefits" started in approximately the late 1980s. Court documents show that LA County claimed their purpose was "to attract and retain well- qualified judges to serve the public in one of the most expensive regions of the state" However, the superior court judges are not hired by LA County, nor are they employees of LA County. They are initially appointed by the Governor of the State of California and then elected every six years in an open election. They are State of California employees. There was not any reason for LA County to pay "local judicial benefits" "to attract and retain well- qualified judges to serve the public in one of the most expensive regions of the state".

This opinion was expressed by Ronald M. George, the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court in a September 15, 2000, speech to the California Judges Association Meeting in San Diego, California where he stated regarding the LA County payments to the LA Superior Court Judges:

"That state of affairs is not only wrong, it may be unconstitutional."

LA County Documents Show That the Effect of the LA County Payment of "Local Judicial Benefits" Has Been to Deny People Their Constitutional Rights of "Access to the Courts" and "A Fair Trial" in the LA Superior Court

An October 3, 2007 letter from the LA County Counsel to the LA Board of Supervisors, indicates that the "real purpose" of the payment of "local judicial benefits" is to reduce the exposure of LA County to liability in the LA Superior Court. This was accomplished by creating a financial atmosphere in which judges deciding LA County cases were relying financially upon LA County for their living expenses and therefore would not decide against LA County. The statistics supported this "real purpose".

LA County statistics set forth in the October 3, 2007 letter showed in FY 2006-2007 that 670 new cases were filed and 261 dismissals occurred based upon favorable rulings for LA County. This is approximately 39%. The October 3, 2007, letter did not state the ratio of filed cases to dismissals for non LA County cases. LA County took 24 cases to trial and prevailed in 15. Five were defense [jury] verdicts. This shows that 10 defense decisions were done by the LA Superior Court judges. This is over 41%. These are more cases decided by judges against the plaintiffs, than the 9 cases the plaintiffs won at trial before a jury. It appears from the October 3, 2007 letter that the plaintiffs did not win any cases before a judge.

These statistics show on their face, that the $46,436.00 cash payments to the judges who were deciding LA County cases may have affected their decisions, as apparently no judge decided in favor of the plaintiffs in any case against LA County.

Specific examples further bolster this conclusion by showing this activity has been systematically occurring from prior to 1999 through the present.

In 1999, in the case of Silva v. Garcetti and LA County, LASC Case No. BC 205645, App. No. B 150641, S. Ct. No. S 105221, LA County and the LA District Attorney were sued for unlawfully withholding $14 million in child and spousal support payments beyond the 6 month statutory time period.

LA Superior Court Judge James C. Chalfant dismissed the case, even after LA County had testified that they started to pay out the overdue child and spousal support monies. After the case was over, it was discovered that Judge Chalfant had been receiving monies from LA County during the case and did not disclose such. The payment of monies to Judge Chalfant was then raised with the California Court of Appeal who stated that, it was too late to raise such in a decision dated February 6, 2002. The payment of monies was raised with the California Supreme Court who refused to hear it, and the case, on May 22, 2002.

By March, 2002, it was discovered that Justice Todd of the California Court of Appeal, one of the justices who refused to consider the payments to Judge Chalfant, had received monies from LA County while she was a recent LA Superior Court judge, and did not disclose such in the appeal. The other appellate justices also did not disclose that they knew of the payments to Justice Todd. This fact was disclosed in the federal civil rights complaints of LACAOEHS v. County of Los Angeles and Kurt Lewin USDC Case No. CV 02-02190 AHM (filed March 15, 2002) and John Silva v. Chalfant et al, USDC Case No. CV 02-04645 AHM (filed June 13, 2002)

Additionally in a the case of Amjadi and LACAOEHS v. County of LA Board of Supervisors et al , filed in 1994, LASC Case No. BC 110446, App. Nos. B137683, S. Ct. No. S 096448 and B 138307, plaintiffs won on May 12, 1999, an $11 million judgment and an injunction requiring LA County to establish a "special fund" for "environmental inspection fees" collected, place the $11 million in such "special fund" and freeze such "environmental inspection fees" for 3 years or until the $11 million was exhausted. On average, approximately $40 million per year is collected in "environmental inspection fees". The Court did not award Amjadi and LACAOEHS (a LA County union of environmental inspectors) attorneys fees. After the case was over, it was discovered that Judge Kurt Lewin was receiving "local judicial benefits" monies from LA County during the case.

In 2004-2007, in a series of taxpayer cases entitled Coalition to Save the Marina and Marina Tenants Association et al., v. County of Los Angeles et al., LASC Consolidated Case No. BS 089838, LA County and various developers of Marina del Rey were sued to void the leases between LA County and the developers on the grounds that they were "an unconstitutional gift of public funds to a private person" in violation of California Constitution Article XVI, Section 6. The suits also sought to obtain hundreds of millions of dollars owed to the taxpayers of LA County due to under payments on the leases compared to fair compensation which would have been paid in a "fair" commercial transaction paying LA County the fair market value for the land leased to the developers.

Plaintiffs sought to disqualify Judge Soussan G. Bruguera for receiving "local judicial benefits" from LA County. Judge Bruguera struck the disqualification even while admitting that she was receiving the monies from LA County. The California Court of Appeal refused to hear the petition for writ of mandate to order her disqualified and the case transferred out of the LA Superior Court (App. No. B178404) and the California Supreme Court refused to review the petition (S. Ct. No. S128928).

Judge Bruguera dismissed the cases before trial, however, she delayed her decision for over 90 days thus placing plaintiffs in a position that they either had to file a notice of appeal before she rendered her decision, thus losing their constitutional right to have a court decide their case or allow her to decide and be subject to California Rule of Court (CRC) Rule 8.104(a) and CRC Rule 8.108(b) and (d) requiring a notice of appeal to be filed the earlier of 90 days after a motion for reconsideration is filed or 180 days after the judgment is filed when no time limit is set on the trial court to decide the motion.

These CRC rules are a denial of due process, as they remove the Constitutional right to trial in the first instance and the right to have a court hear the matter in the second instance. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal filed after the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration on the 91st day (App. No. B198659) and the California Supreme Court refused to hear the matter (S. Ct. No. S157640), thereby denying the plaintiffs their constitutional right to have a court hear their matter.

The taxpayers of LA County would have recovered up to $700 million in lost lease payments from the developers due to the unconstitutionality of the leases if the cases had not been dismissed.

In January, 2008, in the case of Marina Strand Colony II Homeowners Association v. County of Los Angeles, Real Parties in Interest Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North, LASC Case No. BS 109420, Judge David P. Yaffe issued a sanction and attorneys fee order against Richard I. Fine, without notice or hearing in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution after Richard I. Fine was no longer in the case. Later, on March 20, 2008, Judge Yaffe, admitted in open court to receiving "local judicial benefit" monies from LA County.

On March 25, 2008, a CCP section 170.3 "Objection" was filed against Judge Yaffe based upon his admission to receiving monies from LA County. He did not timely respond and was "deemed to have consented to the disqualification" under Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. section 170.3©)(4). Judge Yaffe than violated such section by refusing to transfer the case for reassignment. After he was disqualified, Judge Yaffe later entered an unlawful judgment against Fine based upon the unconstitutional order and unlawfully heard an attorneys fee motion and refused to award attorneys fees to Fine who had prevailed in the case, of almost $300,000.00.

LA County knew that it had cases before the LA Superior Court judges when it gave them the "local judicial benefit" monies and the LA Superior Court judges knew that LA County had cases before them when they accepted the "local judicial benefit" monies and did not disclose such to the public or the other party.

These actions may violate the mail fraud statute as they violate "honest services" mail and wire fraud ("honest services fraud") within the meaning of the statute. The LA Superior Court judges and Court officials know that they are denying access to the courts and due process to every individual or entity who is a litigant against LA County, by deciding cases when they are receiving money from LA County.

The systematic acceptance of bribes or loans by a judge and not disclosing such by a judge has been held to be "mail fraud" in the case of United States v. Holzer, 81 F. 2d 304, 308 (7th Cir. 1987) vacated 484 U.S. 807 (ordering reconsideration in light of McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359 1987), reinstated under 18 USC section 1346 overturning McNally and reinstating pre McNally case law. See United States v. Grandmaison, 77 F.3d 555, 565-566 (1st Cir. 1996) and United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 723-725 (1st Cir. 1996). In Holzer, supra, the court stated at 81 F.2d at 311:

"In this circuit it is extortion if the official knows that the bribe, gift, or other favor is motivated by a hope that it will influence him in the exercise of his office and if, knowing this, he accepts the bribe."

The California State Bar's Prosecution Against Richard I. Fine Was a Sham, Without Merit, Frivolous and Baseless

The Sturgeon decision shows that the California State Bar's prosecution against Richard I. Fine was a sham, without merit, frivolous and baseless. The State Bar's case was filed against Fine on February 6, 2006. The State Bar case alleged that Fine had violated section 6106 of the California Business & Professions Code by filing disqualifications against LA Court Commissioner Bruce E. Mitchell (for receiving "local judicial benefits" amongst other things), filing two appeals, one motion to amend a complaint (seeking an injunction to stop the payment of "local judicial benefits"), two writs in the court of appeal (one for mandamus and one for supersedeas), and three federal civil rights cases (two seeking relief based upon the unconstitutional and unlawful "local judicial benefits" payments and the third related to the unconstitutional actions of the judges who had accepted the "local judicial benefits" payments and not disclosed such).

The State Bar knew from the outset that its case was a sham, without merit, frivolous and baseless. The State Bar also knew that the case violated the First Amendment's freedom of free speech and freedom to petition the government to redress grievances.

The Sturgeon case was filed two months later on April 24, 2006. The Sturgeon case contained the same allegations relating to LA County's payment of "local judicial benefits" as did Fine's cases filed four years earlier in 2002, of LACAOEHS v. County of Los Angeles and Kurt Lewin (Lewin [LACAOEHS] case) and John Silva v. Chalfant et al, (Silva case) (a taxpayer defendants class action case seeking to enjoin the payment of "local judicial benefits" to LA County Superior Court judicial officers who were hearing cases involving LA County). The Lewin [LACAOEHS ] case, the Silva case and the Sturgeon case all claimed that the "local judicial benefits" payments violated Article VI, section 19 of the California Constitution and were not allowed under the Lockyer-Isenberg 1997 Trial Court Funding Act.

Two and one half years after the filing of the State Bar case, the State Bar recognized that it was violating the First Amendment and retracted its entire case. The State Bar stated in its Responsive Brief on Review filed April 25, 2008 (Responsive Brief) and at oral argument that "This is not a First Amendment case" and it is not prosecuting Respondent for the "content" of Respondent's statements, Respondent's "speech", Respondent's "rhetoric" or Respondent's having made the argument against "local judicial benefits" being paid by LA county to LA Superior Court judges.

In its Responsive Brief, the State Bar stated at page 32, ln. 25-page 33, ln. 10:

"3. The First Amendment is not an issue in this matter.
The State Bar seeks to discipline Respondent not for the content of his statements, but his conduct: Respondent's calculated, deliberate and repeated abuse of the judicial system.

Those allegations in the NDC, specifically counts 2 and 4, which were based upon or targeted the alleged falsity of specific statements made by Respondent, were dismissed by the Hearing Department. As set forth above, the State Bar is not challenging those dismissals.

Respondent's reliance on Standing Committee v. Yagman (9th Cit. 1995) 55 F.3d 1430 as a defense in this matter is misplaced. The charges in this matter are not an attack on speech.

Standing Committee v. Yagman involved statements by an attorney which allegedly impugned the integrity of a judge. The issues here, inter alia, were a question of the truth or falsity of the assertions, whether a prosecuting agency beared [sic] the burden of proving the falsity and whether truth was a defense to discipline. These issues are not relevant here.

Additionally it is clear that rhetorical hyperbole is not disciplinable. The State Bar is not seeking to discipline Respondent for his rhetoric. (Emphasis added.)"

At oral argument before the State Bar Court, Kevin Taylor reprised these arguments, stating in relevant part:

"This is not a First Amendment case. This is not about things that were said. This is about things that were done. ..And it's his conduct in filing those actions that's at issue here, not what he said in those particular pleadings. I believe many of those pleadings were based upon those local judicial benefits argument that's made throughout this case. We're not seeking to discipline Mr. Fine for having made that argument..... (Emphasis added.)"

Subsequently the State Bar did not oppose the CCP § 425.16 Anti Slapp Motion, which requires the State Bar to state any basis it has to bring a case which in its opinion can overcome the rights expressed in the First Amendment. By not opposing the motion, the State Bar consented to the granting of the Anti Slapp Motion. Pursuant to CRC Rule 8.54©):

"A failure to oppose a motion may be deemed a consent to the granting of the motion."

The State Bar has now taken itself out of this case.

The Sturgeon decision shows that the State Bar's case is a sham, false, baseless, meritless and frivolous. As shown above, the Sturgeon decision specifically held that "the practice of the County of Los Angeles of providing Los Angeles County superior court judges with employment benefits, in addition to the compensation prescribed by the legislature, is not permissible" as a past and current practice , violated and violates Article VI, § 19, of the California Constitution and are not allowed under the Lockyer-Isenberg 1997 Trial Court Funding Act.

The Sturgeon decision reinforces the fact that not only was the State Bar wrong in prosecuting Fine, but that Fine was correct in his legal theory and his actions.

The California State Bar Court's Recommendation That Richard I. Fine Be "Disbarred" for Having Brought Federal Civil Rights Cases Claiming the LA County Payments Were Unconstitutional and Having Filed Motions to Disqualify Judicial Officers Based upon Their Having Received the Unconstitutional LA County Payments a Sham, Without Merit, Frivolous and Baseless

The State Bar Court Review Department stated that its "opinion" was premised upon the "conclusions" that the Lewin [LACAOEHS], Silva and Fine v. Mitchell federal cases and the challenges to Commissioner Mitchell were "frivolous" and "meritless".

The State Bar Court Review Department's September 19, 2008 Opinion and Order stated:

(1) that the Lewin federal case, the Silva federal case, the Mitchell federal case and the challenges to Mitchell were "a pattern of deliberately and repeatedly misusing this state's statutory process for challenging a judicial officers qualifications" followed by a "campaign of repeatedly filing meritless lawsuits in federal court" (Review Department"s September 19, 2008 Opinion and Order page 1, quoting from Hearing Judge's October 12, 2007 Decision and Order);

(2) "In Count 18, the State Bar charged respondent with violating section 6106 by knowingly filing a frivolous federal complaint with the intent to delay and harass...We leave undisturbed the hearing judge's treatment of these charges and agree with his determination that the Silva federal complaint was frivolous and filed for the improper purpose of harassing judicial officers." (Review Department"s September 19, 2008 Opinion and Order page 27);

(3) "Count 20: The State Bar charged respondent with violating section 6106 because he filed a frivolous action and the hearing judge agreed, finding that "respondent ...placed before a federal court a claim with absolutely no substance or merit." We agree. In filing the Mitchell federal complaint, respondent continued to pursue the same claim for relief that had been twice denied him as meritless in the Lewin and Silva matters...." (Review Department"s September 19, 2008 Opinion and Order page 27); and

(4) We further agree with the hearing judge's finding that "Respondent's misconduct clearly establishes a pattern of misconduct in which respondent deliberately and for an extended period of time misused this state's statutory process for challenging a judicial officer's [impartiality] to decide a proceeding ....and then deliberately and repeatedly filed frivolous federal court actions against any judicial officer (including Superior Court Judges and Court of Appeal Justices) who ruled against him, in an attempt to coerce and intimidate the judicial officer into ruling in respondent's favor and to have the same judicial officers improperly removed from cases to which they had been duly assigned." (Review Department"s September 19, 2008 Opinion and Order page 28, quoting from Hearing Judge's October 12, 2007 Decision and Order).

The Sturgeon decision shows that both the premise and the conclusion of the State Bar Court Review Department's September 19, 2008 Opinion and Order and the predecessor Hearing Judge's October 12, 2007 Decision and Order, are false, unlawful and in violation of substantive California law and stare decisis. No court had sanctioned Fine for filing any case against any judge or judicial officer, in particular in the Lewin [LACAOEHS] case, the Silva case or the Fine v. Mitchell case.

The September 24, 2001 contempt action, which was the basis of the Fine v. Superior Court state case relating to the challenges to Commissioner Mitchell, upon which the State Bar Court relied for the proposition that sanctions had occurred relating to challenges to Commissioner Mitchell, had been voided and annulled, leaving Fine v. Superior Court an erroneous, unconstitutional void decision that Justices Boren, Nott and Todd had refused to remove.

The timing of Fine v. Superior Court showed that it was decided after Justices Boren, Nott and Todd knew that Justice Todd had received money from LA County and was concealing such from Fine and his client in the Silva v. Garcetti case which they decided on February 6, 2002, on month before the first decision in Fine v. Superior Court, on March 14, 2002. The actions of Justice Todd were exposed one day later, in the Lewin federal complaint filed March 15, 2002. (OCTC Tr. Ex. 164) Despite this exposure of Justice Todd's violation of Article VI, § 19, of the California Constitution, the Code of Judicial Ethics and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, Justices Boren, Nott and Todd knowingly did not change or remove the modified decision in Fine v. Superior Court decided, on April 11, 2002, (OCTC Tr. Ex. 163) and persisted in not removing Fine v. Superior Court from publication, further manifesting their bias, unlawful conduct and conflict of interest.

In 2003, Judge Czuleger, knowing that Commissioner Mitchell did not have jurisdiction in the DiFlores case and knowing that his actions were unconstitutional, entered the 2003 contempt order against Fine. He knowingly, relied on the invalid case of Fine v. Superior Court. Judge Czuleger was also receiving money from LA County and not disclosing such. In 2006, Judge Czuleger did not respond to a CCP § 170.3 "Objection" related to his conduct including his actions with Commissioner Mitchell to falsely invoke the jurisdiction of the court for the 2003 contempt proceeding, and was deemed to have consented to the disqualification under CCP § 170.3©)(5), thereby voiding the 2003 contempt order.

On April 24, 2006, two months after the State Bar case was filed and before the Hearing Judge ruled on the first motion to dismiss, the Sturgeon case was filed. At this time, there was no question that the State Bar case was a sham.

On April 25 and June 24, 2008, the State Bar effectively dismissed its case by removing the content of Fine's statements, Fine's "speech", Fine's "rhetoric" and the "local judicial benefits argument" from the State Bar case. In September, 2008, the State Bar "consented" to the dismissal of the State Bar case by not responding to the CCP § 425.16 Anti Slapp Motion.

The earlier Lewin [LACAOEHS] federal complaint and Silva federal complaint manifested the same basic charges as the Sturgeon case.

The Lewin [LACAOEHS] federal complaint (OCTC Tr. Ex. 164) cited to the payments from LA County at paragraphs 1, 7, 8, 9, 16 (which specifically mentioned the Lockyer-Isenberg 1997 Trial Court Funding Act), 17 (which specifically mentioned the Lockyer-Isenberg 1997 Trial Court Funding Act and Govt. Code §§ 69894.3, 69894.4, 69894.1 and 53200.3 and the unconstitutionality of the payments under Article VI, section 19), 18, 19, 20 and 26.

The Silva federal complaint (OCTC Tr. Ex. 170) cited to the payments from LA County at paragraphs 1,2, 3, 7 (which specifically mentioned the Lockyer-Isenberg 1997 Trial Court Funding Act), 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, (which specifically mentioned the Lockyer-Isenberg 1997 Trial Court Funding Act and that the payments are voluntary), 15 (which specifically mentioned that the payments were voluntary), 17, 18, 19-24 (which specifically mentioned the Lockyer-Isenberg 1997 Trial Court Funding Act), 25 (which specifically mentioned Govt. Code § 53200.3), 26 (which specifically quoted Article VI, section 19), 29, 30, 31, 32, 36, and 46.

Article VI, § 19, of the California Constitution was one of the prime bases of the Lewin federal case and was specifically mentioned in the Lewin federal complaint (OCTC Tr. Ex. 164) at paragraph 17:

Even references to Government Code § 53200.3 referring to 'group insurance' for judges under a county plan are questionable as an unconstitutional delegation of a non delagable duty under Article IV [sic] § 19, of the California Constitution... (Emphasis added.)

Article VI, § 19, of the California Constitution was one of the prime bases of the Silva federal case and was specifically mentioned in the Silva federal complaint (OCTC Tr. Ex. 170) at paragraph 26:

Under the California Constitution, Article VI, § 19:

The Legislature shall prescribe the compensation for judges of courts of record.

The constitutionality of such payments was referred to in paragraph 30 of the Silva federal complaint by quoting the statement of California Chief Justice Ronald M. George on September 15, 2000 to a meeting of the California Judges Association relating to the LA County payments to the LA Superior Court judges as follows:

That state of affairs is not only wrong, it may be unconstitutional.

The Silva federal case sought an injunction:

(1) Enjoining Defendant County of Los Angeles ("LA County") from making payments of "local judicial benefits" to Los Angeles County Superior Court judges and court commissioners who preside over cases in which LA County, its agencies or elected officials are a party;

(2) Compelling Chalfant, Todd, Mitchell, Los Angeles County Superior Court judges and court commissioners who are receiving payments of "local judicial benefits" from LA County and former Los Angeles County Superior Court judges who are presently California Court of Appeal justices who have received payments of "local judicial benefits" from LA County to disclose such payments; and

(3) Compelling Boren, Nott and California Court of Appeal justices who have knowledge that Los Angeles County Superior Court judges, court commissioners or California Court of Appeal justices received "local judicial benefits" from LA County to disclose such knowledge of such payments; (Emphasis added.)

The Silva federal case is mentioned at paragraphs 20, 21, 25, 26, in the Fine v. Mitchell case (OCTC Tr. Ex. 173).

All of the defendant judicial officers in the Lewin [LACAOEHS], Silva, and Fine v. Mitchell federal cases were LA Superior Court judges, LA Superior Court commissioners and California Court of Appeal justices who had either received LA County payments of "local judicial benefits" in addition to their State compensation and not disclosed such, or knew of their colleague judicial officer on a case where LA County was a party having received such and not disclosed such, and they also concealed such information from the other party and the taxpayers.

All of the challenges in the State Bar case relate to Commissioner Mitchell, particularly the Tenth challenge to Commissioner Mitchell in the DiFlores case (Count 3) which was the same substantive challenge made against other judges who were receiving payments ("local judicial benefits") from LA County, which was that they could not be objective where Fine was counsel. Prior to the challenge being made against Commissioner Mitchell, Judge Richard Hubbell found the challenge to be valid and recused himself, demonstrating that such challenges had merit.

Other than Fine v. Superior Court and the 2003 contempt order, which as shown above were unconstitutional, erroneous and void decisions, no court has held that any challenge was "frivolous" or "meritless".

Prior to making its September 19, 2008 Opinion and Order, the State Bar Court Review Department knew all of the above. The State Bar Court Review Department also knew that the State Bar stated in its Responsive Brief on Review filed April 25, 2008 and at oral argument that "This is not a First Amendment case" and it is not prosecuting Fine for the "content" of Fine's statements, Fine's "speech", Fine's "rhetoric" or Fine's having made the argument against "local judicial benefits" being paid by LA county to LA Superior Court judges.

The State Bar Court September 19, 2008 Opinion and Order at page 14 cited to the decision of the federal judge in the Silva federal case (OCTC Tr. Ex.171) referring to the Silva federal matter to be "an ill-conceived meritless complaint against state judges who have ruled against his client or him in state court proceedings" and "to punish judges who have ruled against him" and that the plaintiff failed to establish that the "judges have a pecuniary interest, direct or otherwise, in the outcome of cases in which the County is a party", because "The Court need not decide the disputed issue whether the County's payment of benefits is voluntary or mandatory to hold that Silva has not stated a due process violation. Simply, Silva has not demonstrated a realistic, immediate, possibility that the County will stop paying local judicial benefits to superior court judges if they render decisions unfavorable to the County." (OCTC Tr. Ex. 171 page 15)

As shown by the Sturgeon decision the federal court judge in the Silva federal case was wrong as he never considered the illegality of the local judicial benefit payments by LA County under Article VI, § 19 of the California Constitution or under the Lockyer-Isenberg 1997 Trial Court Funding Act even though such were pled in the Silva complaint. The State Bar Court Review Department was wrong to rely on the federal judge as his statements were not based upon any substantive law, and the State Bar Court Review Department knew this.

The Sturgeon decision shows that the entire basis for the State Bar Court Review Department's September 19, 2008 Opinion and Order is a sham, false, baseless, meritless and frivolous.

The State Bar Court Review Department falsely concluded that the Lewin [LACAOEHS] federal case, the Silva federal case, the Fine v. Mitchell federal case and the challenges to Commissioner Mitchell were "a pattern of deliberately and repeatedly misusing this state's statutory process for challenging a judicial officers qualifications" followed by a "campaign of repeatedly filing meritless lawsuits in federal court" (Review Department"s September 19, 2008 Opinion and Order page 1, quoting from Hearing Judge's October 12, 2007 Decision and Order) The Sturgeon decision has shown this conclusion to not only be unsupported by any facts, but also false and wrong.

The California State Bar and State Bar Court Were Acting to Assist the Los Angeles Superior Court to Retaliate Against Richard I. Fine for Being the First Lawyer to Expose and Seek to Stop the Unconstitutional and Unlawful "Local Judicial Benefit" Payments

As shown in the State Bar Reporters Transcript, LA Superior Court Commissioner Bruce E. Mitchell was the "complaining party" in the State Bar case. Commissioner Mitchell was a defendant in the Silva federal case and had received as of that time approximately $89,277.27 in "local judicial benefits" from LA County while sitting as the "temporary judge" in the eminent domain department of the LA Superior Court. (OCTC Tr. Ex. 170 paragraph 11). The State Bar never disclosed that LA Superior Court Commissioner Mitchell was the "complaining party". The State Bar made the false statement in the Declaration of Gerald E. Magnuson that the State Bar started the investigation.

No reason existed for the State Bar to violate the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and prosecute Fine at the behest of the LA Superior Court for challenging a court commissioner and judges who were taking unconstitutional "local judicial benefits" and not disclosing such, other than the political reason to stop and intimidate Fine and anyone else from challenging the payments to the judges and court commissioners.

The State Bar and the State Bar Court knew that such a case would fail in any "objective" court.

No person made such challenge again until Judicial Watch, a well funded national organization, using its own lawyers both from California and Washington, D.C., brought the Sturgeon case two months after the State Bar case was filed against Fine. No "local" lawyer joined Judicial Watch in the Sturgeon case.

The Sturgeon case like earlier Lewin [LACAOEHS] and Silva cases was based upon Article VI, § 19 of the California Constitution and the Lockyer-Isenberg 1997 Trial Court Funding Act. A major difference was that the Sturgeon case did not name the judges as formal defendants. The LA Superior Court judges, court commissioners and court employees are the real parties most affected by the payments, next to the taxpayers whose money is being paid out. This was the politics of the case which has now been exposed.

As expected, and predicted by California Chief Justice Ronald M. George in 2000, the "local judicial benefits" were ruled to be unconstitutional.

The State Bar and the State Bar Court knew and could have expected that this result in the Sturgeon case would occur as Chief Justice George's statement "That state of affairs is wrong, it may also be unconstitutional" referring to the LA County payment of "local judicial benefits" was quoted at paragraph 30 of the Silva federal complaint (OCTC Tr. Ex. 170) in the State Bar Trial.

The State Bar and State Bar Court also knew from this reference that the entire State Bar prosecution and State Bar Court decision was a sham, without merit, frivolous and baseless.

Further the State Bar and State Bar Court knew that they were only acting to assist the Los Angeles Superior Court to retaliate against Richard I. Fine for being the first lawyer to expose and seek to stop the unconstitutional and unlawful "local judicial benefit" payments.

The Sturgeon decision has shown that no reason exists for the State Bar prosecution of Fine or the State Bar Court decision recommending the "disbarment" of Fine other than political retaliation for Fine having to have been the first lawyer to expose and seek to stop the unconstitutional and unlawful "local judicial benefit" payments.

The Sturgeon decision has vindicated Fine's actions to protect our constitutional rights in the face of political pressure from LA County and the LA Superior Court.


• Grand jury report questions county benefits for San Bernardino County judges