January 07, 2009

By Richard I. Fine (View author info)

The commencement of the of unconstitutional payments by LA County to LA Superior Court judges was "unnoticeable" to the people of LA County in the late 1980s. Yet, its effect began to permeate the Los Angeles political and judicial systems to the extent that fundamental constitutional rights were compromised.

Twenty years after the commencement of the payments, the political and judicial systems of LA County are rife with conflicts of interest, lack of disclosure and the failure to enforce constitutional rights and laws.

A well traveled "money trail" exists from LA County who makes payments to LA Superior Court judges [present and past] who decide cases in favor of LA County.

A second well traveled "money trail" exists from political contributors [many times "developers"] who give political contributions to LA Supervisors [who decide in their favor] who make LA County payments to LA Superior Court judges who decide cases in favor of LA County [and the developers who are co parties with LA County].

The "money trials" have cost taxpayers approximately 1 billion dollars in lost income from Marina del Rey alone. Add to this the financial and emotional cost of the cases involving children where the LA County may be involved, cases where home owners and LA County are involved, eminent domain cases, and all other cases where LA County or one of its agencies is involved and the cost to the taxpayers is astronomical.

Since the commencement of the LA County payments to the LA Superior Court judges, Los Angeles has had two judicial systems. One for LA County and one for the rest of the world..

This is the story of how the people of LA County lost their freedom and the fight of Richard I. Fine, sometimes known as a "crusader" or the "taxpayer advocate attorney", to restore our constitutional rights and bring the control of government and the judicial system back to the people, by challenging the wrongdoing of the "entrenched powers" of LA County, the Marina del Rey "developers" and the LA Superior Court judges.

John Rizzo, President of the Marina Tenants Association and a class representative in one of the taxpayer class action lawsuits against LA County and the Marina del Rey developers stated: "After 33 years of fighting the corruption in Marina del Rey between the lessee developers and the LA County Board of Supervisors, and then fighting the judges of the LA Superior Court, I am hopeful that finally the problems will now be resolved and the people will receive justice."

I. The "Money Trail" Between Marina del Rey "Developers", LA County Supervisors, LA Superior Court Judges and Their Decisions Favoring LA County and the "Developers"

As of the year 1995, according to contribution reports, campaign contributions from "developers" to whom LA County leased land in Marina del Rey (lessees) to the campaigns of the members of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors were approximately $600,000.00 for the previous number of years. Since the year 2000 through 2005, campaign contribution reports and lobbyist reports show that lessees in Marina del Rey have spent more than $763,000 in lobbying members of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (approximately $663,000.00) and making campaign contributions to the campaigns of the members of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (approximately $100,000.00 with more than $41,000.00 contributed to Don Knabe whose district includes Marina del Rey).

Political campaign contributions to LA County Supervisors have resulted in illegal approvals of projects in Marina del Rey.

In 2007, contributions to LA County Supervisors Antonovich and Knabe from Marina del Rey "developers" Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North through Jerry B. Epstein, the Epstein Family Trust, Pat T. Epstein and David O. Levine in April 2007, within six weeks of the vote of approval of the EIR for the Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North Project for the re development of a 202 unit apartment complex into a 544 unit apartment complex with 1088 parking spaces, resulted in the illegal votes for the "developers" by the LA County Supervisors Antonovich and Knabe on May 15, 2007. This violation of the Political Reform Act has been reported to the Fair Political Practices Commission.

According to the Minutes of the September 13, 2006 Small Craft Harbor Commission Meeting, page 6, David Levine, who made the application for the project, also represents himself as a representative of the Marina del Rey Lessees Association.

In 2008, contributions to LA County Supervisors Antonovich, Knabe and Molina from Marina del Rey "developers" Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North through Jerry B. Epstein-8/14/08 and 10/8/08, David O. Levine-8/15/08, 10/08/08 and Marina Properties, LLC-3/18/08 (an entity controlled by Jerry Epstein) within one year of the vote of the approval of the re circulated EIR for the Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North Project resulted in the illegal votes for the "developers" by the LA County Supervisors Antonovich and Knabe on May 15, 2007. This violation of the Political Reform Act has been reported to the Fair Political Practices Commission.

The effect of the LA County payments to the LA Superior Court judges was unconstitutional decisions by the LA Superior Court judges in favor of LA County and the "developers".
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The unconstitutional payments from LA County to the LA Superior Court judges were occurring when Judge Bruguera, who admitted to receiving such payments, dismissed four cases against LA County and Marina "developers" affecting income to taxpayers from Marina del Rey leases of approximately $ 700 million and payment for "lease renewals" of approximately $70 million in two of the cases and hundreds of millions for all of the "lease renewals" in Marina del Rey.

Judge Yaffe, who admitted receiving such payments, did not address the loss of income to LA County as shown in the Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North EIR and cost taxpayers tens of millions of dollars.

The influence of the "money trail" has even extended to the California State Bar. Sheldon H. Sloan, a lawyer for "developer" the Epstein Family Trust, Jerry B. Epstein and Pat Epstein was the President of the State Bar and a member of the Board of Governors. Jeffrey Bleich, a partner in Munger, Tolles & Olson, [who represents the County of Los Angeles in the Option for and Amended and Restated Lease with Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North] was the successor President of the State Bar and a member of the Board of Governors. Both Sloan and his client and LA County, the client of Munger, Tolles & Olson benefitted by the State Bar prosecuting Richard I. Fine their "current" opposing counsel in current cases and matters relating to LA County and "developers" Marina Pacific Associates and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North [Jerry B. Epstein, the Epstein Family Trust, Pat T. Epstein].

Laura Chick, present LA City Controller (and former LA City Councilperson involved in one of the cases in the State Bar case), who allowed a $5,000.00 "behest" to given in her name by Latham & Watkins the lobbyist for Playa Capital Co., Ltd, on June 6, 2007 the day after she released a favorable "audit" for Playa Capital Co., Ltd, and prior to her August 7, 2007 response to LA City comments on the "audit" is on the Board of Governors. She benefitted by the State Bar is prosecuting Richard I. Fine, the counsel who charged her with ethical violations for "allowing" the "behest".

The State Bar Court "judge" hearing the case, Richard A. Honn had a conflict of interest mandating his disqualification. He sits on the Board of Governors of the Southern California Special Olympics with Gerald Hime of the LA County Office of Education. LA County donated two payments of $15,000.00 each to the Special Olympics from July 1, 2005 to January 18, 2008. Vincent H. Herron of Latham & Watkins, who gave the $5,000.00 "behest" with the approval of Laura Chick is a member of the Board of Directors.

State Bar Hearing Department Judge Patrice E. McElroy who was the Hearing Department judge who refused to disqualify Judge Honn did not disclose that she was a member of the Board of Directors of the San Francisco Child Abuse Prevention Center, that Jerry Roth of Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP is also a member of the Board of Directors, that the President of the State Bar as of September 29, 2007 (succeeding Sheldon H. Sloan) is Jeffrey Bleich who is also a partner of Munger, Tolles & Olson resident in the San Francisco office, and that Campaign Contribution Records obtained from the Los Angeles Times showed that Munger, Tolles & Olson attorneys contributed $14,250.00 to LA County Supervisors Antonovich, Burke, Molina and Yaroslavsky from 2001-2005 demonstrating an interest in the County of Los Angeles beyond the ordinary citizen. She also did not disclose that the "Option" and Draft "Amended and Restated Lease" between the County of Los Angeles and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North shows "Approved as to Form" by Munger, Tolles and Olson on behalf of the County of Los Angeles.

II. The Effect of the LA County Payments to the LA Superior Court Judges on the Judicial System.
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Whether "deliberate" or "subconscious", the "bias" created by the LA County payments has permeated the judicial system and undermined the Constitutional rights to petition the government to redress grievances and to receive due process.

LA County has been paying LA Superior Court judges "local judicial benefits" in addition to their State compensation since the late 1980s. As of the present time California Court judges receive a base salary and benefits of $192,386.00 (Salary-$178,789.00). LA Superior Court judges receive $249,413.00 (LA County payments of up to $46,386.00 per year per judge). LA County payments total approximately $21 million per year to LA Superior Court judges in addition to their current State of California salaries, giving them higher annual "compensation" than U.S. Supreme Court Associate justices who receive $217,000.00 and the U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice who receives $218,000.00.

From the time the LA County payments began in the late 1980s through the present, LA County has paid the LA Superior Court judges over $300 million.

Decisions of LA Superior Court judges in a few cases affecting income from LA County leased land to "developers" in Marina del Rey show that taxpayers have "lost" at least $700 million in income from the value of LA County leased land in Marina del Rey, and at least $70 million in fees for "lease renewals".

This approximate 1 billion dollars is just the "tip of the iceberg".

Annual Litigation Reports from the LA County Counsel to the LA Board of Supervisors dated June 9, 2005, October 3, 2007 and October 1, 2008 show that in the years 2005, and 2006-2007, no one won a case against LA County when a LA Superior Court judge made the decision. Calculations have not been made to determine the value of the cases against the County which were lost.

Nor do statistics appear to exist to measure the "losses" both financially and emotionally in the child protective services cases or other cases where a County agency is a defendant or a party and a LA Superior Court judge has made a decision, or where the LA Superior Court judge is sitting on a "Board" of a defendant who has received LA County money.

Formal complaints had been made to the U.S. Attorney General to impanel a federal grand jury in Los Angeles to investigate and prosecute any violations of law resulting from the LA County payments to the LA Superior Court judges, the non disclosure of such and other related violations, including but not limited to the violation of the "right to honest services" and "mail fraud".

III. LA County and the LA Superior Court Judges Knew From the Beginning that the LA County Payments to LA Superior Court Judges Were Unconstitutional and Would Double Charge LA County Taxpayers for the Same State "Judicial Services" Received by Other California Counties.

A November 10, 1988 Memorandum from LA County Counsel to Frank S. Zolin, County Clerk/Executive Officer, Superior Court, showed that LA County decided to pay LA Superior Court judges "local judicial benefits" consisting of "MegaFlex cafeteria benefits" [of income equal to 19% of the judge's salary], a "professional development allowance" and a 401(k) match "to attract and retain quality judges to serve in this [LA] county".

At the outset LA County and the LA Superior Court knew that LA County could not legally "attract and retain quality judges".

LA County could not "attract and retain quality judges" as judges are elected officials under Article VI, section 16 of the California Constitution. To "attract and retain quality judges" LA County would have to spend taxpayer money on campaign contributions for particular politicians. This would be an unconstitutional gift of public funds to private individuals prohibited by Article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

LA County also could not independently "compensate" LA Superior Court judges. LA County and the LA Superior Court both knew from the 1988 Memorandum, that Article VI, section 19 of the California Constitution stated that only the State Legislature could "prescribe" the compensation of the judges, that the case law held that when a statute read only the State Legislature could "prescribe" something, this duty could not be delegated and that the California Attorney General had issued two opinions stating that counties could not treat judges as county employees for purposes of providing benefits beyond those provided statewide to all judges. The 1988 Memorandum also acknowledged that the judges were state constitutional elected officials.

LA County and the LA Superior Court judges also knew that LA County was a "political subdivision" of the State of California whose property taxes were already being used to pay the compensation of the judges as determined by the State Legislature. They further knew that any additional payment by LA County would "double charge" the LA County taxpayers for the same State "judicial services" received by other counties.

Despite this knowledge, the program was instituted. In 1997, the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act declared that the State was solely responsible for trial court funding to remove the disparities in compensation received by judges in different counties.

IV. Fine Was the First Lawyer to Challenge the LA County Payments to the LA Superior Court Judges Which Have Now Been Ruled Unconstitutional.

Fine was the first lawyer to challenge the LA County payments to the LA Superior Court judges. The first challenge occurred in 2001 in an opening brief in the case of Silva v. Garcetti LASC Case No. BC 205645, App. No. B 150641 (Second Appellate District, Div. 2, February 6, 2002). The case involved the LA District Attorney's Office's refusal to follow the law and timely pay support payments that it had collected to women and children or return such. The Court of Appeal, by Justices Boren, Nott and Doi Todd rejected the challenge. The California Supreme Court denied review. The justices did not disclose that Justice Doi Todd, a newly appointed justice, had received payments from LA County when she was a LA Superior Court judge, just prior to her appointment to the Court of Appeal.

This challenge was followed by two federal civil rights cases alleging that the payments violated Article VI, section 19 of the California Constitution and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, LACAOEHS v. County of Los Angeles and Kurt Lewin, UDSC Case No. CV-02-02190 AHM in March, 2002 (LACAOEHS case) and John Silva v. County of Los Angeles, James C. Chalfant, Kathryn Doi Todd, Bruce E. Mitchell, Roger W. Boren, and Michael G. Nott, USDC Case No. CV-02-04645 in June, 2002 (Silva case), respectively. The cases were dismissed without the court ruling on the "constitutionality" of the payments.

V. The LA Superior Court Retaliated with State Bar Complaints and Contempt Charges.

A. The LA Superior Court Filed Two Complaints With the State Bar.

The first State Bar retaliation occurred in Case No. 00-O-10175 filed April 22, 2003, over a year after the first federal civil rights case was filed. LA Superior Court Presiding Judge James Basque was the "complainant" and Commissioner Bruce E. Mitchell, a LA Superior Court Commissioner who had received such payments and was a defendant in the federal Silva case, was listed as a witness. Fine moved to dismiss the case on the eve of trial and the State Bar responded by moving to dismiss the case in the "furtherance of justice". The case was dismissed on February 2, 2004.

The second State Bar occurred in Case 04-O-14366-RAH, filed February 6, 2006, charging Fine with "moral turpitude" for bringing the LACAOEHS and Silva cases and a related case Fine v. Mitchell et al., USDC Case No. CV-03-07332 GLT (SGL) in 2003, in addition to filing challenges against Bruce E. Mitchell to sit as a "temporary judge", filing two petitions for writs, filing one motion to amend a complaint and filing an appeal. Commissioner Bruce E. Mitchell, admitted to being the "complaining witness"

Two months later, in April, 2006, Judicial Watch brought the case of Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, Supreme Ct. Case No. S168408, Appeal Case No. D050832, (Certified for Publication), remititur issued ½/09, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC 351286. On October 10, 2008, in an opinion modified November 7, 2008, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held the LA County payments to LA Superior Court judges were "unconstitutional" under Article VI, section 19 of the California Constitution which states that only the California State Legislature can "prescribe the compensation of judges of courts of record". On December 23, 2008, the California Supreme Court denied review.

The Sturgeon decision effectively stopped the extra payments from LA County to LA
Superior Court judges.

The Sturgeon decision also showed that Fine was correct in the LACAOEHS and Silva cases and the related Fine v. Mitchell et al. case, thereby emasculating the bases of the State Bar case and showing such to be a sham.

The case is presently before the California Supreme Court on a motion to dismiss.

B. The LA Superior Court Filed Three Contempt Cases.

The LA Superior Court has brought three unconstitutional contempt proceedings.

The first unconstitutional contempt proceeding occurred with a September 24, 2001 Order and Judgment of Contempt issued by Commissioner Bruce E. Mitchell for CCP 170.3 Objections filed against him. The contempt was affirmed in an unconstitutional appellate decision of Fine v. Superior Court, 97 Cal.App.4th 651 (2002) by Justice Doi Todd who had received payments from LA County when she had recently been a LA Superior Court judge, and Justices Boren and Nott, all of whom concealed the payments to Justice Doi Todd. This non disclosure, itself, was a denial of due process by the appellate court in addition to the other constitutional violations. The California Supreme Court denied review. The U.S. District Court in the case of Fine v. Superior Court, USDC Case No. CV-02-4647 GLT(SLG) on August 12, 2002, issued a Stay of Execution; Order to Show Cause Re Immediately Granting Habeas Corpus Relief. On August 21, 2002, the LA Superior Court "voided and annulled" the September 24, 2001 Order and Judgment of Contempt.

The second contempt proceeding occurred in 2003 when Commissioner Bruce E. Mitchell falsely claimed to be a "temporary judge" in the case of Di Flores et al. v. EHG et al., LASC Case No. BC 150607 after he voided and annulled his claim for such on August 21, 2002, to impose the jurisdiction of the LA Superior Court. Judge J. Stephen Czuleger was disqualified under law in 2006, when he failed to respond to a CCP 170.3 Objection alleging that he acted in concert with Commissioner Mitchell to wrongly impose the jurisdiction of the court and to benefit from an order taking $80,000.00 from the DiFlores Settlement Fund to purchase all claims Fine had against Commissioner Mitchell and "other judicial officers", in violation of the Stipulation of Settlement and Final Judgment in the case of DiFlores et al v. EHG et al., LASC Case No. BC 150607. Court documents in the DiFlores case also showed that Commissioner Mitchell authorized the use of approximately $300,000.00 from the DiFlores Settlement Fund to defend the action challenging such purchase and awarded attorneys in the case $2 million on the condition that they would withhold $566,684.25 to pay for the defense of such action in violation of the Stipulation of Settlement and Final Judgment. The contempt proceeding also was unconstitutional for lack of notice Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974), and appointing counsel for a party who was benefitting from a ruling to prosecute the case. The appointment and prosecution violated the due process clause and the U.S. Supreme Court case of Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils S.A., et al., 481 U.S. 787 (1987).

The third unconstitutional contempt proceeding commenced on December 22, 2008 before Judge Yaffe, who also testified as a witness regarding charges that Fine "attacked the integrity of the LA Superior Court" and "the court [Judge Yaffe]" by stating that the judges of the LA Superior Court had been paid monies from LA County in violation of Article VI, section 19 of the California Constitution, knew that LA County had cases before them when they received the payments, had not reported such payments on their Form 700 Statement of Economic Interests as required by the Political Reform Act and citing to federal case law which held that receiving payments and not disclosing such violated the "right to honest services" and the "mail fraud act".

The charge came in the in the case of Marina Strand Colony II Homeowners Association v. County of Los Angeles, LASC Case No. BS 109420 in which Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North [Jerry B. Epstein, the Epstein Family Trust, Pat T. Epstein and David O. Levine] are the "Real Parties in Interest".

VI. The LA Superior Court Has Shown that It Has Acted Against the Law and the U.S. Constitution in Its Current Contempt Proceeding Against Fine.

This type of contempt proceeding may be a first in judicial history as Judge Yaffe was both a witness and the judge of his own testimony. As such, the proceeding violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, denying Fine access to the courts, due process and a fair trial.

Both the LA Superior Court and Judge Yaffe know that a lawyer cannot be held in contempt for criticizing a judge unless it imminently interferes with the administration of justice. See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374-376 (1947). Political speech-speech about government issues or government officials- is at "the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect" Morse v. Fredericks, _U.S. _ (2007),127 S.Ct. 2618, 2626 (citation omitted) recently cited in Fieger et al., v. Michigan Supreme Court et al., CV 06-11684, page 4, _F.Supp.2d_ (E. D. Mich., 2007), 2007 WL 2571975. Attorney speech concerning a court's actions is political speech. Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948). "The operations of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern". Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 835 (1978). "Speech that concerns public affairs "is more than self -expression; it is the essence of self government." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). The LA Superior Court and Judge Yaffe also know that a criticized judge cannot hear the contempt case of the person criticizing him. See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971), and Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954).

Even as an adverse witness, Judge Yaffe, proved that Fine was correct. Judge Yaffe testified that he had received the LA County payments, that he knew that LA County had cases before him, that he did not disclose the payments on his Form 700 Statement of Economic Interests required to be filed with the State of California under the Political Reform Act, that he was a State of California employee and an elected state judge under the California Constitution, that he did not have any employment contract with LA County or agreement or arrangement to provide services to LA County, that he reported the LA County payments as "income" on his tax returns, that he did not put the LA County payments into his "campaign contributions account" for his judicial elections, and that other than making a decision regarding the re circulation of the EIR in the Marina Strand case, he could not name any case in the last three (3) years where he decided the case against LA County.

After his own testimony, the case should have been dismissed by Judge Yaffe as "truth is an absolute defense". See Standing Committee v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995).

Judge Yaffe's testimony was consistent with documents submitted in the case prior to Judge Yaffe's testimony. Annual Litigation Reports from the LA County Counsel to the LA Board of Supervisors dated June 9, 2005, October 3, 2007 and October 1, 2008 had been submitted showing that in the years 2005, and 2006-2007, no one won a case against LA County when a LA Superior Court judge made the decision. Further, Fine represented to the Court that he had reported Judge Yaffe to the Fair Political Practices Commission for Judge Yaffe's violation of the reporting requirement of his income from LA County under the Political Reform Act.

During the contempt proceeding, Fine informed Judge Yaffe that he had been reported to the Fair Political Practice Commission for violating the Political Reform Act by not disclosing the LA County Payments on his Form 700 Statement of Economic Interests.

In summary, Judge Yaffe's testimony in the contempt proceeding in which he presides as judge in violation of the U.S. Constitution, shows and supports the facts that Judge Yaffe and the LA Superior Court judges received unconstitutional payments from LA County, who they knew to be a party before them in cases, who was not their employer and with whom they did not have any employment contracts or arrangements to provide services, and did not disclose such to the State of California, (their employer) on their Form 700 Statement of Economic Interest in violation of the Political Reform Act.

VII. The Current Contempt Proceeding Exposes for the First Time the "Money Trail" Between Marina del Rey "Developers", LA County Supervisors and LA Superior Court Judges and Their Decisions on "Marina" Projects and Cases Affecting LA County Taxpayers.

A. The Documents and Testimony Expose the "Money Trail" and Unlawful Acts of the Supervisors.

The documents and testimony in the Marina Strand contempt proceeding, have exposed for the first time the "money trail" from the "developer" campaign contributors [Jerry B. Epstein, Pat T. Epstein, David O. Levine and Marina Properties, Ltd., of Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North) to LA County Supervisors who voted in favor of the "developer's " project (Supervisors Antonovich, Knabe and Molina) in violation of the Political Reform Act to unconstitutional payments from LA County to LA Superior Court judges (Judge Yaffe) who decide cases in favor of LA County and the "developer" (impose sanctions and attorneys fees on Fine without notice and hearing and deny attorneys fees to Fine and Zoia as counsel for prevailing party), to the judge (Judge Yaffe) appointing the "developer's" [Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North] lawyer to act as prosecutor for the Superior Court in the contempt proceeding.

The documents in the Marina Strand contempt proceeding show that the "developer" who is the "Real Parties in Interest" in the case is Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North. The lease with LA County for Parcels 100s and 101s where the re development of Del Rey Shores is to occur, shows that Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North are a really a joint venture of Bryna Investments, LP and the Epstein Family Trust, whose Trustees are Jerry B. Epstein and Pat T. Epstein. The Application for the permit to redevelop Del Rey Shores on behalf of Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North was made by David O. Levine.

The documents in the Marina Strand contempt proceeding show that the LA Board of Supervisors vote to approve the EIR for the project occurred on 5/15/07 as a 4-0 vote, with Supervisors Antonovich and Knabe voting in favor of the EIR. The documents show that on 4/04/07 David Levine and the Epstein Family Trust each gave $1,000.00 Supervisor Knabe for a total of $2,000.00 and on 4/24/07 Jerry Epstein, Pat Epstein and David Levine each gave $1,000.00 to Supervisor Antonovich for a total of $3,000.00. These contributions caused the votes of Supervisors Antonovich and Knabe to violate the Political Reform Act, Govt. Code sections 87105, 87300-87302, 87313 and the case of BreakZone Billards v. City of Torrance 81 Cal.App. 4th 1205 (2000). This violation caused the vote to be illegal as only two supervisors voted for the EIR and the supervisors did not have a quorum.

The documents further showed that on 10/08/08 Jerry Epstein and David O. Levine each contributed $1,250.00 to Gloria Molina- Yes on Measure U for a total of $2,500.00; 8/14/08 Jerry Epstein contributed $1,000.00 to Supervisor Antonovich; 8/15/08 David O. Levine contributed $1,000.00 to Supervisor Antonovich; and 3/18/08 Marina Properties, LLC [controlled by Jerry Epstein] contributed $500.00 to Supervisor Knabe. These contributions caused the votes of Supervisors Antonovich, Knabe and Molina to violate the Political Reform Act, Govt. Code sections 87105, 87300-87302, 87313 and the case of BreakZone Billards v. City of Torrance 81 Cal.App. 4th 1205 (2000) with respect to the vote on the re circulated EIR on December 16, 2008. This violation caused the vote to be illegal as only two supervisors voted for the EIR and the supervisors did not have a quorum.

B. The Documents and Testimony Show the Unlawful Acts of the Lawyers of Withholding the Supervisors' Unlawful Vote and Judge Yaffe's Refusal to Investigate Such Even Though the Vote Was in the Record.

The documents and testimony of Judge Yaffe show that neither the lawyers for LA County nor Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North brought the illegality of the May 15, 2007 vote to the attention of Judge Yaffe and that Judge Yaffe did not investigate the legality of the vote when he reviewed the record in the case. As shown above Judge Yaffe admitted that he had received payments from LA County and not disclosed such.

C. The Documents and Testimony Show the Unlawful Acts of the Lawyers and Judge Yaffe to Impose Sanctions and Attorneys Fees on Fine Without Notice or Hearing, to Enforce the Void and Unconstitutional Order, and to Ignore the Disqualification of Judge Yaffe.

The documents and testimony of Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North's counsel Joshua L. Rosen and R.J. Comer further show that after Fine left as Marina Strand's counsel, they did not serve him with documents, the court did not serve him with any notice of any January 8, 2008 hearing, he was not present at such hearing when Judge Yaffe ordered that he pay sanctions and attorneys fees to LA County and Real Parties in Interest, that Judge Yaffe never responded to a CCP section 170.3 Objection served on him on March 25, 2008 thereby disqualifying him from the case under law, and that Judge Yaffe was violating the law by remaining on the case in any matter relating to Fine.

D. The Documents and Testimony Show the Unlawful Acts of the Lawyers and Judge Yaffe to Violate Due Process by Appointing the "Del Rey Shores" Lawyers to Prosecute the Contempt.

The documents show that despite their knowledge of no notice and hearing of the January 8, 2008 order, both the lawyers for Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North and Judge Yaffe proceeded to act to enforce such order even to the extent of Judge Yaffe appointing Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North's counsel, as counsel for the Superior Court to prosecute the contempt and prosecute Fine for refusing to respond to questions and documents to enforce the order. This appointment and prosecution violated the due process clause and the U.S. Supreme Court case of Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils S.A., et al., 481 U.S. 787 (1987).

VIII. The Current Contempt Proceeding Again Exposes the LA County Payments to the LA Superior Court Judges Influence on LA Superior Court Judges' to Refuse to Hold the LA County Supervisors Responsible for Not Protecting the Taxpayers Interest in the Income from Marina del Rey.

A. Five Previous Taxpayer Lawsuits Against LA County and the "Developers" in Marina del Rey Filed From 2004 through 2006 Showing the LA County Leases with "Developers" in Marina del Rey Were Unlawful, Were Dismissed by LA Superior Court Judges Prior to Trial Costing Taxpayers Approximately $700 Million in Lost Income.

Four taxpayer class action lawsuits alleging a gift of public funds to private individuals in violation of Article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution by the LA County Supervisors leases to "developers" in Marina del Rey filed against LA County, Archstone Smith Operating Trust, Kingswood Village- Marina, Villa Venetia, Neptune Marina and the Oakwood consolidated under the case of Coalition to Save the Marina and Marina Tenants Association, et al. v. County of Los Angeles et al., LASC Case No. BS 085898 were dismissed in 2006, motion for reconsideration denied in January, 2007 before trial by LA Superior Court Judge Soussan G. Bruguera. Judge Bruguera admitted that she was receiving payments from LA County in response to a CCP section 170.3 Objection which she "struck". A petition for writ of mandate was summarily denied and a petition for review was denied by the California Supreme Court.

The taxpayers lost approximately $700 million in lost income from the previous ten years in which the County had not received the correct amount of money for the "land value" under the leases to the "developers" in Marina del Rey. The taxpayers also lost approximately $70 million in "lease renewal" payments.

The Verified Complaints each showed that LA County was operating "ultra vires" by leasing Marina del Rey for private apartment use, that LA County was not controlling the prices charged to the public for the apartments and boat slips, that the subleases for apartments and boat slips for one year or less were not "pre approved" or "approved" by LA County, that a "fair and reasonable return on investment" for the "developer" as required under the leases was 10 to 10.5% per year, that the developers were receiving 25% to 51% per year, that a fair return for the taxpayers as "ground rent" on the land leased to the "developers" was 8-9% of the land value per year which would be approximately $100,000,000.00 per year for the 400 of the 800 acres of Marina del Rey currently leased to developers. This is far greater than the $32, 750, 000.00 then being paid by the lessees in Marina del Rey, who were receiving an income of over $300 million per year in Marina del Rey.

The Verified Complaints showed that LA County Counsel has stated, in a formal opinion letter to the predecessor to the Department of Beaches and Harbors dated January 7, 1977, that "[w]e believe that it should be understood clearly that the County and your department are bound by the statutes and the terms of your leases." County counsel stated, in an opinion letter to the Department dated June 6, 1977, written in response to the Lessees' claim that "investment" need not be considered in setting prices in the Marina, that this claim was "not true...when Section 16 says clearly and unequivocally that a fair and reasonable return on investment should be one of the two considerations in determination of fair and reasonable prices." (Emphasis in original.)

This letter also stated that:

Limitation of price inquiry to comparable facilities elsewhere might or might not result in "fair and reasonable" prices at the Marina, because of lack of complete comparability and differences in such things as financial base, i.e., the mix of public fund support and private investment. Hence the Director should look at the lessee's investment and failure to do so would be an abdication of his administrative responsibility." (Emphasis added).

The Verified Complaints showed that as of the year 1995, according to contribution reports, campaign contributions from lessees in Marina del Rey to the campaigns of the members of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors were approximately $600,000.00 for the previous number of years. Since the year 2000, campaign contribution reports and lobbyist reports show that lessees in Marina del Rey have spent more than $763,000 in lobbying members of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (approximately $663,000.00) and making campaign contributions to the campaigns of the members of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (approximately $100,000.00 with more than $41,000.00 contributed to Don Knabe whose district includes Marina del Rey).

The Verified Complaints showed that "Lease extensions" of existing leases for twenty to forty years in which existing lessees were given a "new" lease after the completion date of their "current lease" without the County engaging in public bidding and without the payment of monies to the County representing the "market value" of the "new lease" began to occur in the early 1990s and have occurred with greater frequency since the year 2000.

The Verified Complaints showed that since the year 2000, rents in Marina del Rey have risen significantly while payments to the County under the leases have remained somewhat constant as the County only receives approximately 8.5 to 10% of rental income of the lessees while the lessees' "return on investment" has risen astronomically.

The Verified Complaints showed that despite the County Assessor's Reports which show that the land under the County's leases in Marina del Rey is grossly undervalued in comparison to identical privately held land, the members of the Board of Supervisors have done nothing to improve the income to the County and thereby reduce the lessees' return on investment.

The Verified Complaints showed that despite the County's statements that "high rents" benefit the County, when the leases only allow the County an increase in revenue of 8.5 to 10 cents for every dollar increase in revenue to the lessee, the County and the members of the Board of Supervisors have done nothing to limit prices to the public by controlling the return on investment to 10 to 10.5% and have acted to not impose any limits on the return on investment.

A fifth taxpayer lawsuit against LA County and Marina Pacific Associates was dismissed in 2007. Marina Pacific Associates is a limited partnership in which the Epstein Family Trust is one of the mangers of the general partner and Jerry Epstein and Pat T. Epstein are the Trustees of the Epstein Family Trust.

On June 29, 2005, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Elihu M. Berle issued an oral Order denying a preliminary injunction in the case of Coalition to Save the Marina, Inc., et al., v. County of Los Angeles, Marina Pacific Associates, a California Limited Partnership, and Bellport Group, et al., LASC Case No. BS 092794. The Court held that the County of Los Angeles does not control prices of apartments and boat leases of a year or less under its "restated lease" with Marina Pacific Associates in Marina del Rey; amongst other grounds stating at pages 61 ln. 26 to 62 ln. 15 and 64 ln. 3 to 26 that the "restated lease" submitted as evidence by plaintiffs does not show any "control or system of control on the price at which accommodations may be offered for rent or lease" which is the basis to require the lessee, Marina Pacific Associates to offer any re developed accommodation [boat slip] first to the then existing tenant [Dr. Stuart Hoffman, a legal livaboard] under Government Code § 7060.2(B)(3). The "restated lease" between the County of Los Angeles and Marina Pacific Associates contains the identical price control section as Section 15.19 in the "Amended and Restated Lease" with Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North.

B. LA County Entered into "Lease Extensions" with "Developers" in Marina del Rey at a Fraction of the Value of the Lease Costing the Taxpayers Millions of Dollars

The Verified Complaints dismissed by Judge Bruguera, alleged that LA County entered into twenty to forty year "lease extensions" with "developers" in Marina del Rey without public bidding at a fraction of the value of the lease which was a gift of public funds to private individuals in violation of Article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

(1) The Archstone Kingswood Lease Extension

On or about March 3, 2004 Lease No. 3823 was assigned to the Archstone Smith Operating Trust, who paid Kingswood Village- Marina and its management company approximately $87 million for the eighteen years remaining on the lease until March 31, 2022.

On or about March 3, 2004, the Board of Supervisors of LA County approved an Option for Archstone to enter into a new lease commencing April 1, 2022 until March 31, 2042. (entitled Option to Amend Lease Agreement (Parcel 102S)). This was pursuant to a negotiation between Archstone and the County which was not public, without any open meeting, statement of terms or sealed bids as required by Government Code section 25526. Archstone paid an Option Fee of $100,000.00 upon execution of the Option. Upon exercise of the Option, Archstone paid $2.21 million less the $100,000.00 paid for the Option for the twenty year new lease, or approximately 2% of the price Archstone paid Kingswood and its management company for the eighteen remaining years on the present Lease No. 3823.

(2) The Oakwood Lease Extension

On December 18, 1968, the County of Los Angeles and Oakwood's predecessor in interest entered into Lease No. 73713 for Parcel No. 103T, Oakwood Apartments. The Lease was to expire on March 31, 2022. On November 29, 2001, the Lease was amended and restated to extend the term through March 31, 2042. Parcel 103T consists of 11.4 acres of land area owned by the County of Los Angeles and 597 residential apartment units.

On or about July 19, 2005, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors approved a Consent to Assignment of Lease and Major Sublease for assignment of Parcel 103T lease from Oakwood Marina del Rey, LLC (Oakwood), to ASN Marina LLC (ASN Archstone), approved a "Residential Master Lease" between ASN and Oakwood and approved an amendment to Amended and Restated Lease No. 73713 amending various provisions of the lease in order to clarify definitions and obligations under the lease to aid in the implementation of lease provisions and provide for the discontinuance of the furnishings replacement sinking fund; and find that the proposed assignment of leases are exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act.

ASN Archstone paid $34,800,000.00 for the acquisition of the Leasehold as part of $84,000,000.00 to Oakwood as part of the total purchase price for the leasehold interest and improvements thereon. A guaranty was given to the County of Los Angeles by Archstone-Smith Operating Trust, a $9.3 billion real estate investment trust and the sole member of ASN. The Residential Master Lease requires Oakwood to continue the "day today" operation of the leasehold property for a term of next seven years.

LA County received nothing for the approval of the transfer of the $34,800,00.00 LA County "leasehold interest" from Oakwood to Archstone.

(3) The Marina Pacific Lease Extension with the Epstein Family Trust

On June 28, 1963 the County and Marina Pacific Associates, a limited partnership [of which the Epstein Family Trust is one of its controlling general partners] or its predecessors in
interest entered into Lease No. 7073 for Parcel No. 111T and Parcel 112T for a term which extended from April 1, 1963 until March 31, 2023. On June 10, 1969, Parcel 112T was separated and a new Lease No. 14910 for the same term was executed between the County and Marina Pacific Associates or its predecessors.

On April 16, 2002, the County granted Marina Pacific Associates an option to amend and restate Lease Nos. 7073 and 14910 and recombine such for a term lasting until March 31, 2062. Marina Pacific Associates exercised the option and paid the County $325,000.00. Marina Pacific Associates is obligated to pay a total of $3,250,000.00 for the forty year "new lease" subject to Extension Fee Credits which could reduce the payment to zero or close thereto according to ¶ 2 of the Amended and Restated Lease.

On October 20, 2003, the County entered in an Amended and Restated Lease Agreement No 74638 with Marina Pacific Associates (Lease) for parcels 111T and 112T. The "new lease" for forty years occurred without public bidding or notice to the public in any newspaper.

IX. The New "Amended and Restated Lease Agreement" Extending the Lease for Parcels 100s and 101s from 2022 to 2061 for the Price of $ 1 Million Shows that It Is Violating the California Constitution by Giving Away Public Property to Private Individuals and Taking Public Property and Using It for Private Residential Apartments.

The Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate in the Marina Strand case alleged that the taxpayers were not receiving a sufficient economic benefit from the lease with Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North. Judge Yaffe did not find for the taxpayers even though the evidence was clear. The Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate stated at paragraph 15, page 14, ln. 22- page 18, ln. 26:

The County will not significantly benefit as it only receives approximately 10% of the rental revenues. Compared to the County services to support the project, the project may be a net loss to the County as more police, fire and other services and infrastructure are needed. No study has been made to show the real cost to the County for the Project.

Further the lease with the lessee is void. The Master Leases are limited to residential uses as shown by the Purpose of the Property sections of the Leases.

Section 3. Purpose or Use of Property

The leased premises shall be used only and exclusively for multiple and single residential units (hotel, motel, apartments, cabanas, or trailer cabanas ) and such other related uses and purposes incidental thereto as are specifically approved and for no other purposes whatsoever without the written approval of County. (Emphasis added.)

The price control duty was included in the Master Leases to ensure that the property would serve a public use. The County in their Opposition to a motion for reconsideration in the case of Coalition to Save the Marina, et al., v. County of Los Angeles, et al., LASC Case No. BS 089838 at page 4, ln. 24 quoting from their previous filings state that "..residential sublessees do not generate revenue or provide services to the public.."

The price control provisions are contained at Section 16 of the Master Leases, which provide as follows:

[Section] 16. CONTROLLED PRICES.

Lessee shall at all times maintain a complete list or schedule of the prices charged for all gods or services, or combinations thereof, supplied to the public on or from the premises hereby demised, whether the same are supplied by Lessee or by its sublessees, assignees, concessionaires, permittees or licensees.

Said price shall be fair and reasonable, based upon the following two (2) considerations:

First, that the property herein demised is intended to serve a public use and to provide needed facilities to the public at fair and reasonable cost; second, that Lessee is entitled to a fair and reasonable return upon his investment pursuant to this lease.

In the even that the Director notifies Lessee that any of said prices are not fair and reasonable, Lessee shall have the right to confer with Director and to justify said prices. If, after reasonable conference and consultation, Director shall determine that any of said prices are not fair and reasonable, the same shall be modified by Lessee or its sublessees, assignees, concessionaires, permittees or licensees, as directed.

The Lessee may appeal the determination of the Director to the Board of Supervisors, whose decision shall be final and conclusive. Pending such appeal, the prices fixed by the Director, shall be the maximum charged by the Lessee. (Emphasis added.)

On November 8, 2006 the subject of Section 16 of the Leases was discussed at the
Small Craft Harbor Commission Meeting. The following is the Excerpt from the tape of such meeting obtained from the Small Craft Harbor Commission:
Faughnan:" Commissioners, all the County leases have the same exact control prices provision which reserves the right to the County, to the Director actually, to review prices charged in the Marina to determine weather they are fair and reasonable and there is a process that the department goes through to review prices and to determine weather or not they are fair and reasonable and they can require the Lessee change the prices if the record determines that they are not fair and reasonable and then the lessee has the right to appeal to the Board of Supervisors. "
Commissioner Searcy: "and what initiates that process, I think that's the big issue"
Faughnan: " What initiates the process is someone coming to the Department and complaining that they have a rent issue, but the Department needs to have actual information, needs to know(unintelligible) that they are being charged unfairly, they need to know the rent that is being charged, they need to know who the lessee is, they need all that actual information, they cannot just investigate based on third hand information".
Commissioner Searcy: Thank you
Commissioner Lesser:" What is the difference between fair and reasonable and fair market value ? "
Faughnan: The Department and the County believes there is no difference between fair and reasonable. Fair and reasonable is fair market value, once again this is something that has been addressed in a litigation brought by the Coalition. (Emphasis added.)

This was the first time that the County has admitted that it did not initiate any control of prices under Section 16 of the Leases. The County had always argued that it had controlled prices under Section 16.

The County has pointed to Policy Statement No. 27 as its method of enforcement. This new statement shows that the County has disregarded Policy Statement No. 27 and disregarded the June 6, 1977 letter to Victor Adorian from County Counsel discussing the responsibilities and duties of the County under Section 16 of the Leases.

This was also the first time that the County admitted that it was disregarding the criteria of Section 16 that prices are controlled by "fair and reasonable cost" to the public and the lessee's "fair and reasonable return upon his investment pursuant to this lease."

These admissions show that the County has abrogated any control of prices under Section 16 of the Leases and allowed the vagaries of the market to control the prices thereby giving huge profits and returns to the lessees at the expense of the taxpayers.

In the case of Coalition to Save the Marina et al. v. County of Los Angeles et al.,
LASC Case No. BS 092794, Section 11.1.2 of the restated Master Lease with Marina Pacific Associates is nearly identical to the present Lease. Such section 11.1.2 states as
follows in relevant part:

Notwithstanding any contrary provision of this Article 11, Lessee shall not be required to obtain County's approval of any Sublease of an individual apartment or boat slip lease in the ordinary course (but not the master lease of multiple units) to a person or persons who will physically occupy the subleased unit, as long as such Sublease is in the form of the standard residential apartment lease or boat slip lease, as the case may be, hereafter submitted to and approved by the County and the term of such Sublease does not exceed one (1) year (each, an "Approved Apartment/Slip Lease"). (Emphasis added.)

The County, demurred to the Second Amended Complaint contending that it should not
be part of the lawsuit as did not control the rentals to sublessees under the Master Lease and admitted at page 5, ln.1-7 of its Memorandum in Support of its Demurrer dated September 7, 2006 as follows:

Under Section 11.1.2 of the Master Lease it is clear that the County does not have the right to approve or disapprove or reject MPA's boat slip tenants. As such, the County has no ability to evict or direct the eviction of Hoffman or any other boat slip tenant under the terms of the Master Lease. Similarly, the County, has no authority under the Master Lease to direct MPA to enter into a boat slip lease with a particular individual. The County should not be subjected to litigating a cause of action that seeks to prohibit it from engaging in an act it is already contractually enjoined from undertaking. (Emphasis added.)

The County again made the same admission at page 2, ln. 25 to page 3, ln. 2 of its
Reply Brief dated October 10, 2006 as follows:

The County's contractual relationship with MPA is governed by the Master Lease. As described in the County's Demurrer, under Section 11.1.2 of the Master Lease, the County does not have the right to approve or reject MPA's boat slip tenants. As such, the County has no ability to evict or direct the eviction of Hoffman or any other boat slip tenant under the terms of the Master Lease. Similarly, the County has no authority under the Master Lease to direct MPA to enter into a boat slip lease with a particular individual... (Emphasis added.)

The County did not change its position at the Hearing on the Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint on October 16, 2006. The County's Demurrer was overruled and the Trial is set for May 21, 2007. The County did not dispute that the Master Lease was void if it did not have the right to approve or reject subtenants.

The lessee in the Marina Pacific case is the Applicant herein.

The cases of International Longshoreman's & Wharhousemen's Union v. Los Angeles Export Terminal, Inc., (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 287, 297-298, Irwin v. Manhattan Beach, (1966) 65 Cal.2d 13, 23, Egan v. City and County of San Francisco, (1913) 165 Cal. 576, 583-584, Haggerty v. City of Oakland, (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 407, 415 and County of Los Angeles v. Nesvig, (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 603, 617, require County control of prices and approval of subleases as a pre requisite for a determination that a "public purpose" exists when public property is leased to private persons. Nesvig provides some guidance with the following observation:

Powers which require the exercise of judgment and discretion ...must necessarily remain with the public agency and cannot be delegated. Thus the issue in each case is whether ultimate control over matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion has been retained by the public entity. Nesvig, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d at 617 (Emphasis added.) .

In Haggerty, supra, the Court stated as follows at 161 Cal.App.415-416 in relevant
part:

...The port has the right to inspect menus , lists and schedules of prices" and if any of them is determined unreasonable or inappropriate for the services rendered or the item sold, the same must be modified as directed by the port......The requirement that all subleases be upon notice to the port manager and his right to disapprove a sublease ensures that conventions desiring to use the premises and approved by the port manager will not be denied such use. (Emphasis added.)

The Court concluded at 161 Cal.App.2d 417:

The controls above mentioned, as well as others contained in the lease, meet the requirements of the Ross case, supra (44 Cal.2d 52), that the municipal lease provide for control of rates, charges and practices of the lessee. (Emphasis added.)

Nesvig, supra at 231 Cal.App.2d at 616-618 further supports the position that the
County has given the public land to private individuals. The court set forth the criteria for County control to avoid a gift of public funds at Nesvig, supra, at 231 Cal.App.2d at 617-618 as follows:

..Thus the issue in each case of delegation is whether ultimate control over matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion has been retained by the public entity. (Egan v. City and County of San Francisco, 165 Cal. 576 [133 P. 294, Ann.Cas. 1915A 754]; City and County of San Francisco v. Ross, 44 Cal.2d 52 [279 P.2d 529]; Haggerty v. City of Oakland, 161 Cal.App.2d 407 [326 P.2d 957].)
In the Egan and Ross cases the contracts were found wanting because the public body had failed to retain control over prices to be charged for the facilities placed under private operation. In Haggerty, on the other hand, the lease of a convention hall and banquet building by the City of Oakland for operation by a private party was found to be a valid exercise of city power under proper controls, since the city retained the right to control the use of the premises for convention or banquet purposes and to control the prices , charges , subleases, and practices of the lessee. (Emphasis added.)

The Commission must consider the recent admissions of the County in deciding on the application. These admissions invalidate the premises upon which the Applicant bases its application as the County being the owner of the land and the Applicant being the lessee claiming under a Master Lease, which is void.

Nothing in the "Record" showed that the County changed or retracted it "admissions" set forth in the Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate.

Further, nothing in the "Record" showed that a study was made to show the real cost to the County to respond to the allegation:

The County will not significantly benefit as it only receives approximately 10% of the rental revenues. Compared to the County services to support the project, the project may be a net loss to the County as more police, fire and other services and infrastructure are needed. No study has been made to show the real cost to the County for the Project.

A. The Taxpayers Are Not Receiving Any Significant Benefit for Agreeing to Extend the Lease by 39 Years.

Section 2.1 extended the current Lease for 39 years for a payment of $1 million.

By contrast, in 2004, when Archstone Smith Operating Trust purchased the forty year leasehold interest from Oakwood, Archstone paid Oakwood approximately $34,800,000.00 for the leasehold interest of the same term. At a minimum, the LA Taxpayers should receive the same amount of money based upon the "value of the leasehold."

B. The Use of Public Property for Residential Apartments Is an Ultra Vires Act By the County.

Section 3.1 of the Lease states:

Specific Primary Use: The Premises shall be used by the Lessee for the operation and management of (1) a residential apartment project, and (ii) such other and related uses as are specifically approved by County (collectively, the foregoing shall be referred to herein as "Permitted Uses") Except as specifically provided herein, the premises shall be used for no other purpose without prior written consent of County. County makes no representation or warranty regarding the continued legality of the Permitted Uses or any of them and Lessee bears all risk of an adverse change in Applicable Laws. (Emphasis added.)

Section 3.3 of the Lease states:

Active Public Use: The parties acknowledge that the ultimate objective of this Lease is the complete and continuous use of the facilities and amenities located in Marina del Rey by and for the benefit of the public without discrimination as to race, gender or religion along with the generation and realization of revenue therefrom. Accordingly, Lessee, agrees and covenants that it will operate the Premises fully and continuously .....in light of these objectives, consistent with the operation of residential apartment facilities, and it will use commercially reasonable efforts so that County may obtain maximum revenue therefrom as contemplated by this Lease. In the event of any dispute or controversy relating hereto, this lease shall be construed with due regard to the aforementioned objectives. (Emphasis added.)

The "residential apartment project" as shown in the EIR is not "open to the public". It is a gated community. It does not have any County government offices or any County facilities.

The use of the property for any purpose other than purpose of County government is ultra vires, even if public use exists and if such public use is diminished. Here the apartment complex is not serving a County purpose as office space etc., and the action of leasing the land for "a residential apartment project" is ultra vires. As shown in Rathbun v. City of Salinas, 30 Cal.App.3d 109 (1973) at 203 that:

a taxpayers suit states a cause of action when, if the allegations be true (as on demurrer they must be deemed), it fairly discloses waste of public funds or property or a manifest use of such funds or property chiefly for long term commercial use with substantial benefit to a lessee accompanied by diminution of active present use of the property for a municipal purpose. The City council's action in such case was ultra vires.

C. The County's Failure to Approve Apartment Subleases or Control Prices Is a Gift of Public Funds to a Private Individual.

The County does not approve subleases of 18 months or less for apartments. Section 11.1.2 states in relevant part:

Notwithstanding any contrary provision of this Article 11, Lessee shall not be required to obtain County's approval of any Sublease of an individual apartment unit in the ordinary course (but not the master lease of multiple units) to a person or persons who will physically occupy the subleased unit, as long as such Sublease is in the form of the standard residential apartment lease hereafter submitted to and approved by County and the term of such Sublease does not exceed eighteen (18) months (each, an "Approved Apartment Lease")....Upon request by County, Lessee shall furnish County with a current rent roll respecting the Approved Apartment Leases and a copy of all such Approved Apartment Leases. (Emphasis added.)

The County does not pre approve or approve the prices charged by the Lessees. Section 15.19 states in relevant part:

Controlled Prices: Lessee shall at all times maintain a complete list or schedule of the prices charged for all goods or services, or combinations thereof, supplied to the public on or from the premises hereby demised, whether the same are supplied by Lessee or by its Sublessees, assignees, concessionaires, permittees or licensees. Said prices shall be fair and reasonable, based upon the following two ( 2) considerations: first, that the property herein demised is intended to serve a public use and to provide needed facilities to the public at fair and reasonable cost; second, that Lessee is entitled to a fair and reasonable return upon his investment pursuant to this lease. In the event that the Director [of the Small Craft Harbor Commission] notifies Lessee that any of said prices are not fair and reasonable, Lessee shall have the right to confer with the Director and to justify said prices. If after reasonable conference and consultation, Director shall determine that any of said prices are not fair and reasonable, the same shall be modified by Lessee or its Sublessees, assignees, concessionaires, permittees or licensees, as directed. Lessee may appeal the determination of the Director to the Board [of Supervisors], whose decision shall be final and conclusive. Pending such appeal, the prices fixed by the Director, shall be the maximum charged by the Lessee. (Emphasis added.)

The "public policy" of the State of California as expressed in its case law criteria set forth in Egan v. City and County of San Francisco, 165 Cal. 576 (1913), City and County of San Francisco v. Ross, 44 Cal.2d 52 (1955), Haggerty v. City of Oakland, 161 Cal.App.2d 407 (1958), and County of Los Angeles v. Nesvig, 231 Cal.App.2d 603 (1965), requires County control of prices and approval of subleases as a pre requisite for a determination that a "public purpose" exists when public property is leased to private persons. The rule is that the public body affirmatively take action rather than leave such action to others.

Without such affirmative action, the leasing is a taking of public property and giving it to private individuals in violation of California Constitution Article XVI section 6 which prohibits a gift of public funds to private individuals.

D. The Income to the County Is a Sham as the Taxpayers Are Paying for the "Affordable Housing" Through an $11,050,000.00 "Lessee Credit" Plus Accrued Interest for Fifty Four Low and Moderate Income Units.

Section 4.41 of the Amended and Restated Lease gives Lessee a "Lessee's Credit of $11,050,000.00 plus accrued interest for seventeen (17) low income and thirty seven (37) moderate income housing units, total 54. This was ten per cent (10%) of the new 544 units. The number of "affordable" units was increased and the credit may have been adjusted upward.

The "minimum rent" was $252,733.00 until the "Completion Date" of the new construction. At such time it moved to .75 of the average total Annual Rent for the projected 36 months. Later it moved to .75% of the average annual rent of the preceding 36 months.

X. The Payments to the Judges Resulted in an Unconstitutional Assault on Fine's Right to Practice Law

A. The State Bar Violated the First Amendment by Bringing Its Case 04-O-14366 RAH, Admitted That it Was Not Prosecuting Fine for the "Content" of His Statements, His "Speech" or His "Rhetoric", Thereby Leaving No Case.

The State Bar admitted in the State Bar's statements in the State Bar's Responsive Brief on Review filed April 25, 2008 and at oral argument on June 24, 2008 that it is not prosecuting Fine for the "content" of Respondent's statements, Respondent's "speech", or Respondent's "rhetoric". The State Bar stated at page 32, ln. 25-page 33, ln. 10:

3. The First Amendment is not an issue in this matter.
The State Bar seeks to discipline Respondent not for the content of his statements, but his conduct: Respondent's calculated, deliberate and repeated abuse of the judicial system.

Those allegations in the NDC, specifically counts 2 and 4, which were based upon or targeted the alleged falsity of specific statements made by Respondent, were dismissed by the Hearing Department. As set forth above, the State Bar is not challenging those dismissals.

Respondent's reliance on Standing Committee v. Yagman (9th Cit. 1995) 55 F.3d 1430 as a defense in this matter is misplaced. The charges in this matter are not an attack on speech.

Standing Committee v. Yagman involved statements by an attorney which allegedly impugned the integrity of a judge. The issues here, inter alia, were a question of the truth or falsity of the assertions, whether a prosecuting agency beared [sic] the burden of proving the falsity and whether truth was a defense to discipline. These issues are not relevant here.
Additionally it is clear that rhetorical hyperbole is not disciplinable. The State Bar is not seeking to discipline Respondent for his rhetoric. (Emphasis added.)
At oral argument before the State Bar Court on June 24, 2008, the following occurred as shown on KNBC TV Channel 4 Los Angeles on October 15, 2008:
LawyerKevin Taylor (before State Bar Court): Mr. Fine's conduct in this proceeding amounts to aggravation.
Paul Moyer: In this review hearing, Attorney Kevin Taylor, representing the State Bar, accused Fine of filing frivolous lawsuits about the payments issue to harass judicial officers who'd ruled against him in other cases.

The State Bar further admitted that in order to show that Fine was outside the protection of the First Amendment, the State Bar would have to show that Fine's filing of a lawsuit was a "sham" or "baseless" or based upon false statements. At pages 3- 4 of Respondent's Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Petition For Review (Respondent's Memorandum), the State Bar acknowledged that a court would have to find that statements are false or litigation is baseless or sham for the immunity of the First Amendment to be removed, citing to Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB (1983) 461 U.S. 731, 743 and McDonald v. Smith (1985) 472 U.S. 479, 484. The Supreme Court in McDonald, supra, held that statements under the petition clause are afforded the same protection as statements under other First Amendment protections at 472 U.S. at 484-485.

The State Bar knew that the "conduct" of filing cases and pleadings was protected under
the constitutional right to petition to redress grievances, the petition clause of the First Amendment. ( California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972) (We recognized that the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances. Accordingly, we construed the antitrust laws as not prohibiting the filing of a lawsuit, regardless of the plaintiff's anticompetitive intent or purpose in doing so, unless the suit was a "mere sham" filed for harassment purposes. Id., at 511))(Emphasis added.)

The constitutional right of freedom of speech and the constitutional right to petition for redress of grievances are inseparable, because the court cannot determine whether a case is a sham, unless it analyzes the "content" of the statements in the pleading filed, the "speech", the "rhetoric" and the "legal arguments" advanced. By the State Bar's own statements, the "content" of the statements in the pleading filed, the "speech", the "rhetoric" and the "legal arguments" advanced, are not part of the Notice of Disciplinary Charges.

However, even if they were, criticism of judges and the judicial system is allowed under the First Amendment. Any act by Fine was exempt under the First Amendment as it did not deny the defendant a fair trial during the trial. (Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1074-76) (speech during a criminal trial protected unless it "creates a substantial likelihood of material prejudice to the fair administration of justice").

Political speech-speech about government issues or government officials- is at "the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect" Morse v. Fredericks, (2007) _U.S. _,127 S.Ct. 2618, 2626 (citation omitted) recently cited in Fieger et al., v. Michigan Supreme Court et al., (E. D. Mich., 2007) CV 06-11684, page 4, _F.Supp.2d_ , 2007 WL 2571975. Attorney speech concerning a court's actions is political speech. Shelly v. Kramer, (1948) 334 U.S. 1, 14. "The operations of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern". Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, (1978) 435 U.S. 829, 835. "Speech that concerns public affairs "is more than self -expression; it is the essence of self government." Garrison v. Louisiana, (1964) 379 U.S. 64, 74-75.

The restriction of attorney speech seeks to achieve two separate interests. The first is a fair trial in the pending proceeding referred to as "fair administration of justice". Neb. Press Assn. v. Stuart, (1976) 427 U.S. 539, n. 27, (J., Brennan concurring). These restraints usually are in the form of rules of professional conduct relating to pre- trial publicity and gag orders. Gentile, supra, 501 U.S. at 1066. The second is preserving the integrity of the legal process and the public's respect for the institution, which concerns prejudice to the judiciary as a whole and not in a particular case, and exists when a case is not pending.

In Bridges v. California, (1941) 314 U.S. 252, 270, this latter interest was found to not be so compelling, and has not been relied upon to uphold attorney speech regulation. See In re Snyder, (1985) 472 U.S. 634 and In re Sawyer, (1959) 360 U.S. 622.

The balancing of the state's interest for fair the administration of justice in a pending case and the First Amendment rights of attorneys in pending cases for statements outside the courtroom in criminal cases was set forth in Gentile, supra, 501 U.S. at 1074-1075 where the court lowered the "clear and present danger" standard set forth in Bridges, supra, at 314 U.S. at 261-262 to allow the restriction of truthful attorney speech that creates a "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" to the fair administration of justice in a pending case. The acts herein do not create this problem, as there is no pending case.

The State Bar had to show that a statement made by Fine in a pleading or testimony is false. Truth is an absolute defense and the disciplinary body has the burden of proving falsity as set forth in Standing Committee v. Yagman (9th Cir. 1995) 55 F.3d 1430 at 1438:

Attorneys who make statements impugning the integrity of a Judge are, however, entitled to other First Amendment protections applicable in the defamation context. To begin with, attorneys may be sanctioned for impugning the integrity of a Judge or the court only if their statements are false; truth is an absolute defense. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74, 13 L. Ed. 2d 125, 85 S. Ct. 209 (1964). Moreover, the disciplinary body bears the burden of proving falsity. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77, 89 L. Ed. 2d 783, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986); Porter, 766 P.2d at 969.

It follows that statements impugning the integrity of a Judge may not be punished unless they are capable of being proved true or false; statements of opinion are
protected by the First Amendment unless they "imply a false assertion of fact." See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19, 111 L. Ed. 2d 1, 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990); Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 555 (9th Cir. 1983); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 (1977) (statement of opinion actionable "only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion"). Even statements that at first blush appear to be factual are protected by the First Amendment if they cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about their target. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50, 99 L. Ed. 2d 41, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988). Thus, statements of "rhetorical hyperbole" aren't sanctionable, nor are statements that use language in a "loose, figurative sense." See National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284, 41 L. Ed. 2d 745, 94 S. Ct. 2770 (1974) (use of word "traitor" could not be construed as representation of fact); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14, 26 L. Ed. 2d 6, 90 S. Ct. 1537 (1970) (use of word "blackmail" could not have been interpreted as charging plaintiff with commission of criminal offense). (Emphasis added.)

B. The State Bar Case Was Being Prosecuted for the Personal Benefit of Sheldon H. Sloan, the President of the State Bar Who Represented Marina Pacific Associates in the Current Marina Pacific Associates Case Where Fine was Opposing Counsel and Laura Chick, LA City Controller, Who Became a Public Member of the Board of Governors of the State Bar and Who Opposed Fine in the Shinkle Case as a LA City Council Member and Currently Opposed Fine in the Playa Vista Case as the LA City Controller Who Had a "Behest" Given in Her Name by a Playa Vista Lobbyist While Still Responding to a Playa Vista Report She Authored.

Documents in the State Bar case show that Sheldon H. Sloan, a member of the Board of Governors of the State Bar and President elect and President of the State Bar at the time that the State Bar filed and prosecuted its case against Fine, was also one of the lawyers opposing Fine in the Marina Pacific Associates case where he was representing Marina Pacific Associates and its general partner controlled by the Epstein Family Trust, of which Jerry Epstein and Pat T. Epstein were Trustees.

Under Section 6079.5 of the Cal. Business & Professions Code, the Chief Trial Counsel (prosecutor) of the State Bar "serves at the pleasure" of the Board of Governors and "shall report to and serve under the Regulation, Admissions, and Discipline Oversight Committee of the Board of Governors of the State Bar".

Documents in the State Bar case show that Laura Chick was appointed a "Public Member" of the Board of Governors of the State Bar. A newspaper interview quoted her as being a friend of Sheldon H. Sloan who encouraged her to apply for the position. The documents further show that she was a LA City Council person at the time that Fine brought the case of Shinkle et al. v. City of Los Angeles, LASC Case No. BC l54805, which caused the LA City Council to change the method for calculating "sewer service charges" thereby saving the residents tens of millions of dollars per year. The filing of two writs, an appeal, and a "disqualification" of Bruce E. Mitchell were part of the State Bar case.

Documents in the State Bar case show that Laura Chick had a "behest" given in her name by Latham & Watkins, the lawyers and lobbyist for Playa Capital Co., Ltd., the "Real Party in Interest" in the case of Grassroots Coalition et al., v. City of Los Angeles, LASC Case No. BS 073182 in which Fine represented the Grassroots Coalition. The "behest" was given on June 6, 2007 the day after Laura Chick issued an "audit" in favor of the City of Los Angeles's actions at the Playa Vista development and before she completed the process of responding to comments to the report by the City departments on August 7, 2007.

Both Sheldon H. Sloan and Laura Chick would personally benefit from the removal of Fine from practice as would Sloan's client Marina Pacific Associates [the Epstein Family Trust, Jerry Epstein and Pat T. Epstein, Trustees] and the City of Los Angeles.

C. State Bar Court Hearing Department Judges Honn and McElroy Each Had A Conflict of Interest Which Disqualified Them From Deciding the State Bar Case and Rendered any Decision by Them Unconstitutional.

Documents in the State Bar case show that State Bar Hearing Department Judge Richard A. Honn who was the trial judge and wrote the October 12, 2007 decision did not disclose that he was a member of the Board of Governors of the Southern California Special Olympics, was a board member with Gerald Hime of the LA County Office of Education, and that LA County donated two payments of $15,000.00 each to the Special Olympics from July 1, 2005 to January 18, 2008. He also failed to disclose that Vincent H. Herron of Latham & Watkins is a member of the Board of Directors.

Documents in the State Bar case show that State Bar Hearing Department Judge Patrice E. McElroy who was the Hearing Department judge who refused to disqualify Judge Honn did not disclose that she was a member of the Board of Directors of the San Francisco Child Abuse Prevention Center, that Jerry Roth of Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP is also a member of the Board of Directors, that the President of the State Bar as of September 29, 2007 (succeeding Sheldon H. Sloan) is Jeffrey Bleich who is also a partner of Munger, Tolles & Olson resident in the San Francisco office, and that Campaign Contribution Records obtained from the Los Angeles Times showed that Munger, Tolles & Olson attorneys contributed $14,250.00 to LA County Supervisors Antonovich, Burke, Molina and Yaroslavsky from 2001-2005 demonstrating an interest in the County of Los Angeles beyond the ordinary citizen. The "Option" and Draft "Amended and Restated Lease" between the County of Los Angeles and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North shows "Approved as to Form" by Munger, Tolles and Olson on behalf of the County of Los Angeles.

The failure to disclose violated CCP section 170.1(a)(6)©) "a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial." and Code of Judicial Ethics Cannon 3E. (1) and (2) which state:

(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which
disqualification is required by law.

(2) In all trial court proceedings, a judge shall disclose on the record
information that is reasonably relevant to the question of disqualification
under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, even if the judge believes there is
no actual basis for disqualification.

The Code of Judicial Ethics Cannons 2 A. and B., and 4 A. and C. (3)©) prohibit a judge from acting in a manner to "to convey the impression that any individual is in a special position to influence the judge" (2B.(1)), "to advance the pecuniary or personal interests of the judge or others" (2B.(2), or " serve as an officer, director, trustee, or nonlegal advisor if it is likely that the organization (I) will be engaged in judicial proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge, or (ii) will be engaged frequently in adversary proceedings in the court of which the judge is a member" (4 C. (3)(c)(I) and (ii)) (Emphasis added.)

Under Article VI, Cl.2 of the U.S. Constitution, judges are required to follow the U.S. Constitution, laws and treaties. State Bar judges took an oath to follow the U.S. Constitution.

Cannon 5 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges States:
A JUDGE SHOULD REGULATE EXTRA-JUDICIAL ACTIVITIES TO MINIMIZE THE RISK OF CONFLICT WITH JUDICIAL DUTIES

Cannon 5 B. States:
B. Civic and Charitable Activities. A judge may participate in civic and charitable activities that do not reflect adversely upon the judge's impartiality or interfere with the performance of judicial duties. A judge may serve as an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal advisor of an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization not conducted for the economic or political advantage of its members, subject to the following limitations:

(1) A judge should not serve if it is likely that the organization will be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge or will be regularly engaged in adversary proceedings in any court.
(2) A judge should not solicit funds for any educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization, or use or permit the use of the prestige of the judicial office for that purpose, but the judge may be listed as an officer, director, or trustee of such an organization. A judge should not personally participate in membership solicitation if the solicitation might reasonably be perceived as coercive or is essentially a fund-raising mechanism.
(3) A judge should not give investment advice to such an organization, but may serve on its board of directors or trustees even though it has the responsibility for approving investment decisions. (Emphasis added.)

State Bar Hearing Department Judges Honn and McElroy should have disqualified themselves at the outset of the State Bar proceedings and never rendered any decisions. By not disqualifying themselves and rendering decisions, they violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

In Clements v. Airport Authority of Washoe County, 69 F.3d 321 (9th Cir. 1995), the court stated at 333-334:

A biased proceeding is not a procedurally adequate one. At a minimum, Due
Process requires a hearing before an impartial tribunal. Ward v. Village of
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 59-60, 93 S.Ct. 80, 83, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972). This
impartial tribunal requirement applies in both civil and criminal cases.
Indeed, the requirement that proceedings which adjudicate individuals'
interests in life, liberty, or property be free from bias and partiality has been
"jealously guarded." Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 241-42, 100 S.Ct. 1610,
1613, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980). Thus, this neutrality principle has been applied
to a variety of settings, including administrative adjudications, in order to
protect the "independent constitutional interest in fair adjudicative procedure." Id. at 241-42 n. 2, 100 S.Ct. at 1613 n. 2. And, it has been invoked
in the context of post-termination administrative proceedings. Walker v. City
of Berkeley, 951 F.2d 182, 184 (9th Cir.1991) (failure to provide impartial
decisionmaker at the post-termination hearing constitutes constitutional error).
Moreover, any bias in the administrative process in Sue's case was not "cured" by the subsequent judicial review in state court. Generally, an adjudication that is tainted by bias can not be constitutionally redeemed by review in an unbiased tribunal. 15 See Ward, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80.
****
The Court stated:
Nor, in any event, may the State's trial court procedure be deemed constitutionally acceptable simply because the State eventually offers a defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance.
Id. at 61-62, 93 S.Ct. at 84.
Ward holds that subsequent state court procedures, even if they include de novo review, can not "cure" bias in the initial adjudication. 16 ....The right to procedural due process is "absolute," and "the law recognizes the importance to organized society that those rights be scrupulously observed. (Emphasis added.)

D. The State Bar Review Department's Action Was Also Unconstitutional, as the Review Department Judges Were Biased.

The State Bar Review Department Judges Epstein, Remke and Stovitz were all defendants in the federal case of Fine v. State Bar of California et al., USDC Case No. CV 08-2906 in which they were co defendants with the State Bar, the Board of Governors, the Chief Trial Counsel [Prosecutor] and jointly represented by the General Counsel of the State Bar in a case seeking to declare unconstitutional the "Moral Turpitude" statute as applied and the "involuntary enrollment statute as violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Each of the State Bar Review Department judges took the position in the joint brief to dismiss the federal case that the statutes did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The issue of whether the statutes violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments was part of the State Bar case on review. The State Bar Review Department judges were biased as they had pre judged the issues in the case, and thereby violated the Fourteenth Amendment.

Conclusion
After twenty years, approximately a billion dollars of taxpayer money lost, three unconstitutional contempt proceedings, one dismissed State Bar proceeding and one unconstitutional State Bar proceeding, hopefully, honesty, integrity and justice will now prevail in the LA political and judicial systems.